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Several in v e stiga tors (e.g., Biederman, et a l . 1974; Loftus &
Bell 1975) have proposed that one's perception and subsequent recogni
tion of pictured scenes re su lts from the ac q u isitio n of two types of
information.

One is sp e c ific in nature and re su lts from the direct

inspection of object detail.

The second type is more general in char

acter and is thought to re su lt from the processing of contextual i n 
formation.

Friedman (in press) has pointed out that context must be

considered to encompass both internal (memorial) and external (physical)
constraints, and as such to have a dual informational base.

The present

study was designed to assess the separate and combined effects of these
internal and external sources of contextual information as they i n f l u 
ence the amount of object detail late r available to the observer.
Each of 72 (21 male) undergrads was presented with a written
phrase p rio r to a 150 msec, exposure of a pictured scene, followed by
a four alte rnative forced-choice recognition test.

Subjects responded

by se lecting one of the four objects in the test as having been viewed
previously, and then rated th e ir confidence in that selection.

The

type of internal or memorial-based contextual information, prompted
1

by a written phrase describing the theme of each stimulus picture,
was varied within subjects such that each subject viewed one-third of
the pictures preceded by a compatible theme, one-third preceded by a
neutral phrase, and one-third preceded by an incompatible theme.
External context and recognition test d istra c to rs were varied between
subjects.

External or physical context was either present or absent,

and the d istra c to r objects were objects from d is s im ila r scenes, objects
d iffe rin g from those viewed but from s im ila r scenes, or objects possessing
the same generic name as the target but d iffe rin g in some physical a t
tribute.
D istractors from different scenes consistently resulted in the best
recognition performance and the most confidence, with no differences in
accuracy between the other two d istra c to r types.

Subject confidence was

a more se n sitiv e measure of d istra c to r effects, as ratings were s i g n i f i 
cantly higher when d istra c to rs were varied from the target in object
rather than attribute information.

Recognition accuracy and confidence

were also enhanced when the pre-stimulus prompt was compatible with the
stimulus picture, but only when d istra c to r objects were from d is s im ila r
scenes.

A trend was evidenced suggesting that recognition accuracy may

have been enhanced by the presence of external context when test d is 
tractors were from d is s im ila r scenes, whereas the absence of context
may have fa c ilit a t e d performance when d istra c to rs differed from the
target object only in physical detail.
These findings were interpreted via a consideration of the i n f l u 
ences of the two types of information available in real world scenes
and of the demands imposed on the subject by the p a rtic u la r task employed
to study th e ir perception and recognizabi1ity.
2
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ABSTRACT
Several in v e stiga to rs (e.g., Biederman, et al. 1974; Loftus &
Bell 1975) have proposed that one's perception and subsequent recogni
tion of pictured scenes re su lts from the a cq uisition of two types of
information.

One is sp e c ific in nature and re su lts from the direct

inspection of object d etail.

The second type is more general in char

acter and is thought to result from the processing of contextual in 
formation.

Friedman (in press) has pointed out that context must be

considered to encompass both internal (memorial) and external (physical)
c o nstra in ts, and as such to have a dual informational base.

The present

study was designed to assess the separate and combined effects of these
internal and external sources of contextual information as they i n f l u 
ence the amount of object detail late r available to the observer.
Each of 72 (21 male) undergrads was presented with a written
phrase p rio r to a 150 msec, exposure of a pictured scene, followed by
a four alternative forced-choice recognition test.

Subjects responded

by se lecting one of the four objects in the test as having been viewed
previously, and then rated th e ir confidence in that selection.

The

type of internal or memorial-based contextual information, prompted
by a written phrase describing the theme of each stimulus picture,
was varied within subjects such that each subject viewed one-third of
the pictures preceded by a compatible theme, one-third preceded by a
neutral phrase, and one-third preceded by an incompatible theme.
External context and recognition test d istra c to rs were varied between
ix

subjects.

External or physical context was either present or absent,

and the d istra c to r objects were objects from d is s im ila r scenes, objects
d iffe rin g from those viewed but from sim ila r scenes, or objects possess
ing the same generic name as the target but d iffe rin g in some physical
attribute.
D istractors from different scenes consiste ntly resulted in the
best recognition performance and the most confidence, with no d if f e r 
ences in accuracy between the other two d istra c to r types.

Subject con

fidence was a more se n sitiv e measure of d istra c to r effects, as ratings
were s ig n i f i c a n t l y higher when d istra c to rs were varied from the target
in object rather than attribute information.

Recognition accuracy and

confidence were also enhanced when the pre-stimulus prompt was compatible
with the stimulus picture, but only when d istra c to r objects were from
d is s im ila r scenes.

A trend was evidenced suggesting that recognition

accuracy may have been enhanced by the presence of external context
when test d istra c to rs were from d is s im ila r scenes, whereas the absence
of context may have fa c ilita te d performance when d ist ra c to rs differed
from the target object only in physical detail.
These findings were interpreted via a consideration of the i n f l u 
ences of the two types of information available in real world scenes
and of the demands imposed on the subject by the p a rtic u la r task employed
to study th e ir perception and recognizability.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The psychology of visual perception has evolved out of the e ffo rts
of scores of inve stiga tors who, over the course of many centuries, have
tried to understand the a b i l i t y of human beings to v is u a lly experience
the world.

The problem faced by each of these inve stiga tors has been

the veracity of th is experience; that is , the a b i l i t y of people to per
ceive the organization and d iffe re n tia tio n inherent in the environment,
often on the b asis of l i t t l e information.

During th is evolution, much

of the theoretical work has been founded upon the study of pictures
and p ic to ria l representations.

Despite assuming a variety of forms,

these representations generally result in a ve ridical experience com
parable to that re su ltin g from direct visual contact with the world.
An explanation of the nature of th is experience, and the structures
and processes which are responsible for it s occurrence, continues to
be the challenge to those psychologists interested in how people per
ceive pictures.
As the study of picture perception has grown, two major the ore ti
cal frameworks have developed to explain present findings and generate
questions for the future.

Both advance explanations for the a b i l i t y of

people to perceive the visual environment in general, and both give
special attention to the perception of i t s surrogates, pictures and
p ic to ria l representations.

(For present purposes, pictures and p ic

to ria l representations are both included to cover the entire spectrum
1
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of visual surrogates, with pictures refe rring to h ig h - f id e lit y repre
sentations such as photographs, line drawings, paintings, etc., and
p ic to ria l representations refe rring to more abstract and symbolic
representations as might be exemplified in geometric figures or the
sign-laden graphics of ancient culture s.)

The two theoretical p osi

tions d if f e r in orientation and focus of study, and with respect to the
types of processes considered c r i t i c a l to an understanding of picture
perception.
The f i r s t framework employs a "r e g is t r a t io n " approach in i t s
study of visual perception.

I t s advocates, J. Gibson (1950, 1966,

1971), E. Gibson (1969), Kennedy (1974), and in his recent work, Turvey
(1975, 1977), emphasize the importance of the information inherent in
the visual environment.

J. Gibson (1950, 1966) proposed that objects

in the environment structure the lig h t they refle ct such that informa
tion concerning the ide ntity, shape, size , color, and p osition of the
object, and i t s rela tionship to other objects, is conveyed d ire c tly
to the observer.

With each glance at the environment, part of th is

available information is registered by the observer and, over succes
sive glances, the information from each overlaps to impart the impres
sion of a stable, s o lid , and complete visual world.

The perception of

th is visual world is accomplished by attending to the invariant in fo r 
mation existent within the variant information that re su lts from suc
cessive glances at the same environment, thus precluding the necessity
of assuming any mental structures to integrate the information from
successive glances (J. Gibson 1966).

The observer i s assigned the

passive role of re g iste rin g the information crucial to an accurate

3

perception of the environment ( i . e . , the invariant information), and
assumes an active role only in searching the environment for informa
tion and continuously developing more refined a b i l i t i e s to d isc rim i
n a t e ^ attend to the most informative environmental stim uli (E. Gibson
1969).

In the sense that the observer simply re g iste rs invariant in

formation, th is framework proposes that visual perception is a direct,
ordinal process (Turvey 1977).
The re g istra tio n approach contends that pictures convey the same
information as the objects and scenes they represent, and are therefore
perceived in an identical manner . . . the invariant information con
tained in the representation is registered over the course of several
fix a tio n s upon the picture (J. Gibson 1971; Kennedy 1974).

In addition,

information is registered t e llin g the viewer that his or her perception
is of a surrogate, thus allowing i t s d ist in c t io n from the direct per
ception of a real world object or scene.
The second major theoretical framework advances a "construction"
approach to the study of visual perception.

It s proponents, Hochberg

(1968, 1970, 1972, 1978), Neisser (1967, 1976), Bruner (1957a, 1957b,
1960), Gregory (1970), and Vernon (1952, 1955, 1970), emphasize the
cognitive a c t iv i t i e s of the perceiver and the interaction of these
a c t iv i t i e s with the visual input from the environment.

Based upon the

notion that visual perception re su lts from the products of looking be
havior, Hochberg (1972, 1975) proposed that such perception involves
purposeful, goal-directed behaviors.

To accomodate the executive func

tions necessitated by such behavior, a mental structure is assumed
that incorporates various cognitive components and functions a c tiv e ly

4

to categorize (Bruner 1957b; Vernon 1970), select (Bruner 1960;
Hochberg 1968, 1978; Neisser 1976), and test (Bruner 1957a; Gregory
1970; Hochberg 1970) input, and generally to serve the perceiver in
the process of synthesizing visual information into a viable percep
tion (Neisser 1967).

Thus, in th is framework, the observer is assigned

an active role id e n tifyin g and comparing visual input within the con
text of a memorial network, as well as gathering additional input to
enhance the comparative process . . .

in short, the role of constructing

the perception responsible for one's visual experience of the world
(Vernon 1952, 1955).
The perception of pictures and p ic to ria l representations re s u lts,
according to Hochberg (1972), from the integration of local features
obtained from momentary glances and information already contained in
the schematic map of the observer.

The schematic map is the mental

structure that is a c tiv e ly constructed out of information retained
(and organized) from past experience and information presently being
obtained from looking behavior.

I t is this schema or schematic map

which functions in an executive capacity (though i t is not ne cessarily
synonymous with the^ executive) to guide the location of future glances,
f a c ilit a t e the encoding of information from the current glance, and
as the standard or expectancy against which incoming information from
local features may be tested for conformity (Hochberg 1968, 1972).
A primary difference between the two frameworks outlined is the
postulation by the construction model of a dynamic mental structure or
representation to function as the mediated perception of input from
the environment; t h i s mediated perception is the perception experienced
by the observer at a given moment in time.

The present study follows
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from th is construction approach and assumes the existence of a mental
representation active in the perception of pictures.
As background, the h isto ry of this notion of an active mental
representation and a representative sample of experimentation on pic
ture perception which evidences selective attentional patterns con
s is t e n t with a model of mediated perception w ill be reviewed.

This

is followed by the presentation of a contemporary theory of picture
perception, and subsequent pertinent research on the processes involved.
The chapter closes by noting the im plications of th is theory and re
search as they relate to the current inve stiga tion.
A History of Process Mediation
The idea that visual perception involves some kind of mental
representation has i t s roots in the early attempts of scholars to
understand how our perceptions of the world are structured into organized
and meaningful experiences.

Although Locke had emphasized the impor

tance of experience and Kant had proposed innate categories of under
standing or pure in tu it io n s , i t was not until Helmholtz that a th e o rist
e ffe c tiv e ly and cogently integrated th e ir notions and expounded on the
influence of an organized recollection of past experience on present
perception.
In implicating the infe re ntial nature of man, Helmholtz (see
Boring 1950) suggested that current perceptions re su lt from the or
ganization of sensory input into fa m iliar categories.

This organiza

tion was seen to refle ct the ways in which the r e g u la ritie s of the en
vironment structure incoming information and allowed the u t i l i z a t i o n
of c a p a b ilitie s for judgment and inference in the perceptual process.
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Current perception was thus viewed as a combination of representations
based upon past experience ( i . e . , fa m ilia r categories) and present
sensation; th is combination being the re su lt of a complex, integrative,
and infe re ntial process.

A perceptual experience was seen as the con

clusion of this process, and synonymous with i t (Pastore 1975).
James (1890) and Titchener (1919) thought perception was the
product of accrued ideas and images as they interacted with present
sensation, with the la t te r th e o rist emphasizing the importance of an
integrated context as the basis for the meaningful (as synonymous with
structure) q u a lity associated with perception.

Titchener related

context to some nebulous mental conste lla tion re su ltin g from th is ac
crual of ideas and images, and thus set the stage for the introduction
of the construct "schema" to capture the envisioned content and process
thought necessary for perception.
The term schema was f i r s t employed in the explanation of percep
tion by Head in 1920, and has since revolutionized s c i e n t i f i c theorizing
on perception.

(Actually, Kant used schema to denote his concept of

pure in tu itio n s as they functioned in perception, but c le a rly his
usage has l i t t l e relationship to the meaning given the term by theo
r i s t s to follow [see O ld fie ld & Zangwill 1942-3]).

Head introduced the

notion of schema to account for the loss of postural perception s u f
fered following lesions to various parts of the motor cortex.

Accord

ing to Head, this schema existed in the brain as an organized, con
sta n tly evolving model or standard against which current postural
position could be evaluated . . . the re su ltin g evaluation equivalent
to a conscious perception.

Thus, perception was viewed as the con

clusion of a comparative process, a comparison between past impressions
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and current sensations made possib le by the existence of th is dynamic
organization called a schema.
B a rtle tt (1932) made heavy use of Head's notion as an explanatory
concept in his c l a s s ic exposition on memorial processes, Remembering.
He su b sta n tia lly enlarged upon the applications and functions of
schemata, formally proposing them as in flu e n tia l and ever-present medi
ators in thinking, remembering, and perceiving.

According to B a rtle tt,

"'Schema' refers to an active organization of past reactions, or past
experiences, which must always be supposed to be operating in any well
adapted organic response" (p. 201, 1932).
His presentation of a mediating representation differed from
Head's in at least three respects.

F ir s t , B artle tt emphasized the be

havioral aspects of schemata, proposing the organization of past reac
tions rather than past impressions.

Second, Head restricte d the occur

rence of schemata to higher (c o rtic a l) levels in the nervous system,
whereas B a rtle tt conceptualized th e ir formulation at a ll le ve ls.

And

third, Head frequently used the term "model" in his account in a
manner suggesting he regarded schemata as s it u a t io n - s p e c ific , whereas
B a rtle tt placed great emphasis upon the generalized nature of schemata.
This generalized character was seen to make our current experiences
prototypical in nature, as opposed to sp e c ific (B a rtle tt 1932).

Bart

le t t also went beyond Head in arguing that our constructed percep
tions incorporate personal in te re sts, values, and needs, and by in tr o 
ducing the notion of "o rie n ta tio n ."

Orientation was regarded as one

of the primary functions of schemata . . .

a function that made certain

perceptual responses more probable in a given situ a tio n , such that
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incoming information is restricte d in it s impact upon the fin a l percep
tual experience.
,

Following B a rtle tt, numerous inve stiga tors (e.g., Itte lso n 1954;

Northway 1940; Wolters 1933) espoused active cognitive mediation of
visual perception, most employing a schema somewhere within th e ir par
t i c u l a r theoretical framework.

Generally, these the o rists had l i t t l e

to add to the construct as conceived by Head and amended by Bartle tt.
There is , however, the work of a few in v e stiga tors that merits d iscu s
sion for it s enrichment or new look at the function of a process media
tor in perception.
An aspect of schema poorly developed by B artle tt i s i t s function
as a plan for perceptual behavior.

I t was Piaget in his voluminous

w ritin g s on developmental epistomology who f i r s t emphasized th is qual
ity .

According to Piaget (1954, 1973), schemata are by nature sensory-

motor plans, cognitive structures related to classes of action-systems
r e la tin g recurrent situ a tio n s to a d isp o sitio n to act.

Schemata were

seen to structure incoming information via the processes of a ssim ila 
tion, and were modified by accomodating to this information.

Thus,

perception was viewed as the product of th is ongoing interplay between
a ssim ila tio n and accomodation.

The planning character evident in Pia

g e t 's approach embraces the same notion of goal-directed behavior that
is late r found in the works of M ille r , Galanter, and Pribram (1960)
and Hochberg (1972, 1975), a ll of whom emphasized the importance of
such behavior for perception.
The emphasis upon personal h isto ry , values, in te re sts, and needs
as they influence perception was enhanced by the T ra n sa c tio n alists
and the ir descendents in the New Look (see Avant & Helson 1973).

The
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T ra n sa c tio n alists viewed perception as the product of many transactions
between the individual and the world . . . transactions giv in g r is e to
assumptions regarding the nature of the world.

These assumptions,

heavily influenced by individual values and in te re sts, are organized
into a schematic representation of the world that functions to integrate
current sensations into a meaningful perception.

While proposing cog

n itiv e mediation in the form of an "assumptive world," they failed
to address i t s nature or the processes responsible for i t s occurrence
(Pastore 1975).

I t was the work of in v e stiga tors such as Bruner and

Vernon that would throw more lig h t on the influence of these id io sy n 
cra tic factors in the categorization and integration of sensorial in 
formation.
Bruner (1951, 1957a) proposed that visual perception re su lts from
the matching of sensory information about an object to a cognitive
"category."

Stimulus information from the environment functions as a

cue (see Brunswik 1956) used by the observer to in fe r category member
ship.

Bruner's categories are analogous to schemata, functioning to

organize object information within the currently e x istin g network of
information already present in the observer.

These categories serve

to guide the selection of cues in accordance with currently operating
hypotheses regarding the nature of the object under consideration.
I t is the hypothesis of the observer that determines the a c c e s s ib il
ity of categories and incorporates in d iv id u a ls ' needs, values, and
p ersonality patterns.

Thus, "perception involves an act of categoriza

tio n " (p. 123, Bruner 1957a), followed by the formulation of hypotheses
used to select more information, and concluding with the confirmation
of these cues as appropriate to the categorization.

Id io syn c ra tic
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factors function to tune the hypotheses in favor of the individual
( i . e . , make them compatible with both past experience and present needs
and in te re sts), with the re su lt that perception tends toward the t y p i
cal or expected and may even d is t o r t the true c l a s s if ic a t io n of object
information and re su lt in a non-veridical perception (Bruner 1951).
Vernon (1955) equated a ssim ilatio n and schematization as pro
cesses responsible for the integration and organization of recorded
sense data into a mental representation or set of expectations.
Schemata were seen to function in perception to produce a condition of
expectation such that the observer knows what to look for in the in 
coming flood of sensory data and how to handle these data . . „ "how
to c l a s s if y , understand, and name them, and draw from them inferences
that give meaning to percepts" (p. 186, Vernon 1955).

The construction

of schemata, lik e the formulation of Bruner's hypotheses, re fle c t the
d iffe re n t experiences of different in d iv id u a ls, and the in te re sts that
led them to seek these experiences.

She viewed the influence of

id io sy n c ra tic factors as both in d ire c t and enduring in th e ir effect
upon sele cting and c l a s s if y in g information.
U t i l iz in g the hypothesis-testing approach of Bruner, Neisser
(1967) proposed that perception is the end re su lt of a preliminary
a n alysis of the visual f ie ld followed by an active synthesis of in f o r 
mation from those objects attended plus information retained from
previous acts of attention.

This constructive act of synthesis thus

r e lie s heavily upon both memorial and attentive processes.

The entire

perceptual process is thought to be c yc lic al in nature, whereby a
schema of the present environment functions to dire ct exploration for
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information, re su ltin g in the sampling of sp e c ific environmental in f o r 
mation which, in turn, modifies the schema of the present environment
. . . and so on (Neisser 1976).

According to Neisser, the schema

represents only one part of the observer's "c o g n itive map" (Tolman
1948) or "v isu a l world" (J. Gibson 1950) and is thus narrower in scope
than either.

To the extent that i t directs exploration i t is termed an

anticipatory schema (see Woodworth 1938), and to the extent that i t
e x ists in a modified form, re la tiv e to it s form in previous phases of
the cycle, i t may be called an orienting schema.

However conceived,

the schema is seen b a sic a lly as a plan of action for se le cting, analyz
ing, and interpreting information received from the environment such
that a meaningful perceptual experience re su lts.
A quite current approach to process mediation in visual percep
tion is based on the concept of "frames" introduced by Minsky (1975).
A frame is sim ila r to a schema in that i t may be viewed as a gener
alized representation of the information acquired from past experiences
re la tin g to a given situ a tio n .

A frame e x ists as a h ie ra rc h ic a lly

organized network of nodes and re la tio n s, the top levels of which are
fixed and represent general information always true about a p articu
la r situ a tio n .

Information at these upper levels of the network may

be thought of as d e fin itiv e with respect to the p a rtic u la r scene or
object that the frame represents.

The lower levels of the network

function as terminals or "pigeon-holes" (Broadbent 1971) ready to ac
cept sp e c ific detailed information gathered from the o b se rve r's cur
rent

interaction with a p a rtic u la r situ a tio n .

Prior to or in the

absence of detailed input, default information ( i. e . , prototypical
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knowledge based upon the aggregate of past experiences the observer has
had with that situ a tio n [see Evans 1967]) occupies these terminals and
can be used to f i l l or read in missing data (Minsky 1975).

Related

frames may themselves be organized into a network or frame system, also
thought to be h ie ra rc h ic a lly organized (see Palmer 1977 for a discussion
of hierarchical organization in visual perception).
Frames may be seen to d if f e r from schemata in that they tend to
be e s s e n t ia lly s t a t ic in character, e xistent as an outline waiting to
be completed by sensory information.

Perception c o n sists of the a ctiva

tion of a frame and/or it s corresponding frame system by the presence
of sensory data or by the preparatory a c t iv it ie s of the perceiver in
anticipation of sense data (Friedman, in press).
Applying the concept of an active mental representation to the
study of visual perception, Hochberg's theorizing has incorporated most,
i f not a l l , of the theoretical work on schema since it s conception,
making his theory useful to consider as a summary to th is h isto r ic a l
presentation.
Hochberg (1975) asserts that the postulation of a schema or
schematic map as a theoretical construct is necessary to account for the
integration of information obtained from successive glances at the
visual f ie ld because such glances may be separated by considerable
time and space, and because some kind of selection occurs during the
interval between glances.
following functions:

He proposed that schematic maps have the

(a) expectancy generalization, (b) information

generalization, (c) feature storage, and (d) peripheral selection of
new information (Hochberg 1968).

Schema thus serve to guide eye
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fix a tio n s via expectancies and peripheral selection,encode information
obtained during the course of a fixa tion using the prototypical informa
tion held in a schematicized deep structure, and store the encoded in 
formation against which to compare new information for recognition and
as a basis for a judgment about where to locate the next fix a tio n .

The

generalized or prototypical nature of information stored in the schema
t i c map is viewed by Hochberg as the reason the perceiver can go beyond
the information given and generate information consistent with past ex
perience and enduring d isp o sitio n s.

In emphasizing the purposeful qual

ity of the looking behavior that ultimately re su lts in a visual percep
tion, Hochberg (1970) refers to schematic maps as "perceptuo-motor
analogs" generated by the perceiver and used to extract and edit the ,
most useful information from that availab le so that the experience i s an
organized and meaningful one.

Coming to a meaningful experience is

accomplished through the integration of successive samples of environ
mental information and is most e ff ic ie n t when the selection of information
to be sampled is consistent with the currently operating schematic map.
Therefore, schemata become a primary determinant of the alloca tion of
attentional effort.
In concluding th is review of the h isto r ic a l development of the
concept of mental structures or schemata as active mediators in visual
perception, i t i s important to note that there has been no attempt to
discuss those theories (e.g., Hebb 1949; Koffka 1935; and in some res
pects Neisser 1967) which suppose mental representations or images pos
se ssing a one-to-one correspondence with the object or scene they rep
resent (see Anderson 1978; Pylyshyn 1973; Sloman 1971 for such a d isc u s
sio n ).

The structure generally and v a rio u sly referred to as a schema,
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schematic map, or frame is presumed here to have no such correspondence
( i. e . , i t is propositional rather than analogical in character— see
Palmer 1975b; Winston 1975).
For the most part, present usage of the concept of a mental repre
sentation e n ta ils a synthesis of Hochberg's and M in sk y 's descriptions,
combining the emphasis of the former on process and the focus of the
la tte r upon structure.

This representation is assumed to be the con

struction of the observer b u ilt from various sources of information and
functioning as a continually active process in the selection of in f o r 
mation and in the modification of it s own form.

I t is th is representa

tion that is perceived and is synonymous with one's perception at any
given moment.
For c l a r i t y 's sake, the term schema w ill be used in the remainder
of th is report whenever possible.

However, the reader should remain

a le r t to the subtle differences in meaning that have been ascribed to
d iffe re n t terms used to construe mental representations involved in
visual perception, and know that such differences may influence one's
thinking appreciably.
Looking at Pictures
I t is important to examine, at least in a representative fashion,
p rio r studies conducted on attentional patterns in the perception of
pictures and p ic to ria l representations for at le a st two reasons.

F ir s t ,

these studies provide evidence that the object of attention at any
given moment is not the result of some random process, but rather re
fle c ts systematic and directed behavior, and thereby implicate the
presence of some organizing and guiding structure at work during the

/
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perceptual process.

And secondly, i t i s a reasonable assumption that

the information extracted from a p ic to ria l stimulus i s highly corre
lated with the focus of attention ( i . e . , we extract more information
about those objects and scenes to which we attend than about those to
which we don't attend).

Therefore, an examination of attentional pat

terns of subjects confronted with p ic to ria l stim uli not only supports
the notion of an active mental representation, but also y ie ld s great
in sig h t into the kind of information encoded by the observer and a v a i l 
able fo r late r use.
To address the question of attention alloca tion when viewing
pictures, one may begin with the f i r s t systematic study of how people
look at pictures.

In 1935, Buswell used corneal reflection techniques

and movie camera recordings to determine the eye movements of adults
as they viewed numerous pieces of c la s s ic a l art.
two basic patterns of looking occurred:

He discovered that

the f i r s t was described as a

general survey of the picture marked by a series of short pauses over
the major portions of the picture, followed by a detailed study of the
picture involving long fix a tio n s concentrated over small areas of the
picture.

Buswell also noted that the duration of eye fix a tio n s in 

creased as subjects continued to view the picture, suggesting that
they were spending more time processing the detail of the picture as
viewing progressed.
More recently, Yarbus (1967) found that people tend to direct
th e ir attention to the most informative aspects of a picture.

Under

free-viewing conditions subjects would fixate the eyes, nose and mouth
of a face and would direct th e ir gaze toward people rather than

)

/
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inanimate objects.

Subjects also tended to fixa te contours and other

physical aspects of the picture l ik e ly to inform them of it s content.
Further, Yarbus found that subjects' pattern of eye movements exhibited
a noticeable degree of repetitiveness over the course of viewing, with
late r fix a tio n s re-examining portions of the picture fixated e a rlie r
(see also Noton & Stark 1971).
Under more precise conditions, Mackworth and Morandi (1967) em
ployed a free-viewing paradigm where the subjects scanned a picture for
10 sec.

The major difference between th e ir procedure and that used by

Yarbus was that pictures were divided into 64 sections and each section
was subjectively rated for recognizabi1it y and informativeness without
the raters viewing the intact picture.

Mackworth and Morandi found that

the location and density of eye fix a tio n s of a d ifferent group of sub
jects viewing the entire picture were highly related to these ratings,
with high informative sections receiving the most fix a tio n s and the
longest duration.

A na lysis of each 2 sec interval showed that the den

s i t y of fix a tio n s did not change with time, a pattern inconsistent with
that found by

Buswell (1935).

Because their subjects immediately

fixated informative (unpredictable) aspects of the picture, Mackworth
and Morandi suggested that subjects might use information gathered
peripherally to locate future glances.
A study by Antes (1974) further explored th is tendency of in d i
viduals to focus upon the informative parts of a picture.

Using stimuli

divided into meaningful sections and subjectively rated for the ir
informativeness, an independent group of subjects viewed 10 pictures
taken from the Thematic Apperception Test for 20 sec under free-viewing
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conditions.

He found that the density and duration of fix a t io n s , as

well as the extent of saccades, were not consistent throughout the view
ing period.

Over the course of viewing the picture, subjects i n i t i a l l y

fixated for short periods of time on highly informative areas of the
picture and gradually shifted to a looking response where fewer saccades (longer durations) were made and fix a tio n s were directed at the
le sse r informative picture parts.

Consistent with the findings of

Buswell (1935) two d is t in c t patterns of viewing were evidenced.

The

i n i t i a l and immediate attention to informative picture sections in
th is study provided further support for the notion of some extrafoveal
mechanism guiding fix a tio n location, and subsequently the extraction of
information.
The controlled attentional response evidenced in the studies above
is also found under task-imposed conditions.

Yarbus (1967) had sub

jects view pictures under s ix d iffe re n t sets of instru c tio n s (e.g.,
evaluate the economic status of the family pictured), and noted that
the density and duration of fix a tio n s was greatest on those aspects of
the picture lo g ic a lly most informative with regard to the question
posed by the experimenter (e.g., furniture, clothing, and other material
p o sse ssio n s).
During a visual search task an i n d iv i d u a l 's fix a tio n and duration
patterns are influenced by a number of variables.

Gould (1967; Gould

& D ill 1969; Gould & Peeples 1970) conducted a se rie s of experiments
where subjects were shown a nonsense pattern (the standard) in the middle
of a display and were required to find i t s match among numerous pat
terns located in the periphery.

Results revealed that increasing the

s im ila r it y of target and non-target patterns lead to more and longer
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fix a tio n s, and that increasing the number of target elements had the
same effect.

I t might be concluded that the degree of d i f f i c u l t y in a

discrim ination task i s related to the p rob ab ility of attention being
directed to areas most helpful for the t a s k 's completion.

Relevant

also i s the evidence that peripheral information is active in the de
termination of fix a tio n location.
In another study of search times, Pollack and Spence (1968) in 
vestigated the impact of informativeness upon locating a targeted sec
tion from a picture.

Five pictures were divided into 70 sections and

rated on a 12-point scale for informativeness in terms of the impor
tance of the section to the overall meaning of the picture.

Assuming

attention is necessary for rapid search, they found the pictures rated
most informative to be discovered more rapidly than those rated least
informative in a ll three search conditions they employed.

Along with

making fewer errors, these faste r search times for highly informative
traget sections provide additional support that attention is attracted
by the most informative areas of the picture f i r s t .
The rated informativeness of picture sections as an intervening
variable in recognition and lo c a liz a tio n tasks has also been studied.
Antes (1977) divided color pictures into eight sections and had subjects
rate the sections as either high or low in informational value with
respect to the overall meaning of the scene.

Using an independent group

of subjects, he found that both recognition and lo c a liz a tio n accuracy
depended upon the rated informativeness of the section probed and it s
location re la tiv e to the center of the picture.

High informative and

c e n tra lly located sections were more accurately recognized and located
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than low informative and peripherally located sections, with the effects
of informativeness and location apparently independent.
Metzger (unpublished doctoral d isse rta tio n , 1976) also employed
color pictures divided into eight sections, but sections were rated as
high, medium, or low informative.

Like Antes (1977), Metzger found that

recognition depended upon the rated informativeness of the target sec
tion and i t s location in the picture.

In addition, he found that in 

formativeness and location interacted, with medium informative picture
sections better recognized at peripheral locations while highly in f o r 
mative sections were more accurately recognized when they were cen
t r a l l y located.
Two recent studies have addressed the nature of informativeness
in pictures.

Taken together they provide support for the idea that

the constitution of informativeness, and therefore a primary determi
nant of attentional a llo c a tio n , involves both physical and cognitive
components.
Antes and Stone (1975) employed a multidimensional s im ila r it y
a n a ly sis of 10 judges' ratings of informativeness for a sin g le stimu
lus picture divided into 32 sections.

That a n a ly sis revealed that

ratings of high-informativeness were prim arily based upon the presence
of id e n tific a b le features or detail in the rated section, and the
meaningfulness of these features or objects in terms of the meaning of
the intact stimulus picture.

That read ily id e n tifia b le objects define

high ly informative picture sections has been confirmed in a study by
Antes, Singsaas, and Metzger (1978).
Examining the determinants of eye fix a tio n s during picture view
ing, Loftus and Mackworth (1978) d ifferentiated between what they
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termed "p h y sic a l" and "semantic" factors in characterizing informative
ness.

C ognitively, an object is informative to the extent that the ob

ject has a "low a p rio ri p ro b a b ility of being in the picture given the
rest of the picture and the su b je c t's past h isto r y " (p. 104).

P h ysic a lly ,

an object is informative to the extent that i t is non-redundant in an
information-theoretic sense (see Berlyne 1960; Garner

1962).

Subjects

were shown 78 pictures for 4 sec with one-half of the pictures contain
ing a c ogn itive ly informative object (e.g., a tractor in an underwater
scene) and the other h a lf containing an uninformative object (e.g.,
the same tractor in a farm scene).

Results showed that subjects fixated

e a r lie r , more often, and for longer durations on the informative ob
jects.

In addition, the extent of eye movements to informative objects

was r e la t iv e ly long (7 degrees), again suggestive of a peripheral e d it
ing process functioning to guide fix a tio n s to informative parts of the
picture

Such a process i s sim ila r to that proposed by Mackworth and

Morandi (1967) but is seen as dependent upon cognitive rather than
physical features.
As noted at the outset, this presentation was intended to be
representative rather than exhaustive.

Numerous additional studies

(e.g., Berlyne 1960; Day 1964; Mackworth & Bruner 1970; Williams 1966)
could be cited that have investigated the variables that influence the
allocation of attentional e ffo rt when viewing p ic to ria l stim u li.
Excellent reviews have been compiled by Rayner (1978) and Kahneman
(1973).

I t might also be noted that a review by Wachtel (1967) d e tails

the influence of the ob se rve r's "s t y le of approach" to pictured in f o r 
mation, a notion which re fle cts the intensive (Berlyne 1960; Hochberg
1972) rather than selective character of looking behavior.
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The studies reviewed in th is section convincingly demonstrate
that the sampling of pictured information is indeed controlled and not
random.

Under both task-imposed and free-viewing conditions, people

look i n i t i a l l y to the most informative areas of a picture.

Most prob

ably, such direction and control is the product of an active mental
representation of the picture enhanced by information gathered from
both foveal and peripheral visio n .

As viewing continues, le sse r in f o r 

mative picture parts of the picture are examined and processed.
Regarding the information extracted as a result of such looking
behavior, i t may be inferred from the two d is t in c t patterns evidenced
in the work of Buswell (1935) and Antes (1974) that more than one type
of information is being gathered.

In addition to the detailed informa

tion gathered during each fixa tion on the picture, the i n i t i a l broad
sweeps across the picture with short fix a tio n s would present the ob
server with a diverse sample of the p ic t u r e 's content, and give the
observer more general or global information about the picture.

This

idea of two kinds of information extracted during the perception of
pictures has recently been developed into a general theory of picture
perception, and is the topic of the next section.
A Duplex Theory of Picture Perception
As noted by Hochberg (1968, 1970), the postulation of some or
ganizational structure is necessitated by the purposeful, goal-directed
nature of our attentional response.

In addition, the influences of

past experience and momentary task demands require that such a stru c 
ture be amenable to change while maintaining i t s identity.
these requirements have been met by the construct "schema."

C la s s ic a lly ,
As
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evidenced in the previous section, attentional patterns in picture per
ception also reveal this controlled and task-directed s e le c t iv it y , and
would thus also imply the existence and functioning of a schema.
A general theory of picture perception has recently been advanced
that incorporates th is idea of a schema.

The theory i s founded p r i 

marily in the empirical work of inve stiga tors interested in the effects
of context on the perception of pictures, the most notable of which is
Biederman.

I t was Biederman (1972) who f i r s t proposed that two types

of information are active in the perception of pictures, but the ante
cedents to th is notion are e a s ily recognized.

As reviewed e a r lie r ,

Buswell (1935) id e n tifie d what he thought to be two attentional pat
terns in his sub jects' responses to c la s s ic a l art, and suggested that
the long fix a tio n s over small areas of the pictures were ind ica tive of
the viewer processing detailed information about it s content.

The

re su lts of several studies (e.g., Hochberg 1968; Mackworth & Morandi
1967) support the operation of some kind of peripheral editing process
p rio r to the focusing of foveal attention, and presumably based upon
information d iffe re n t in character from that gathered foveally.
Further, Karpov, Luria, and Yarbus (1968) remarked on the presence of
what seemed to be two d is t in c t processes of information encoding from
the ir research with brain lesion patients.

And, the d is t in c t io n by

Neisser (1967) between pre-attentional perceptual processes and pro
cesses involving perceptual synthesis suggest the processing of two
types of information in the perception of pictures.

This research

notwithstanding, Biederman's research is the proper sta rt in g point for
what might be termed a "duplex" theory of picture perception.
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Because of the empirical genesis of th is theory, Biederman's re
search w ill be presented f i r s t , followed by a summary describing the
c h a ra c te ristic s of the theory.

Refinements and supporting evidence w ill

conclude this section.
In his 1972 study, Biederman's subjects viewed 96 real-world
scenes and were asked to id e n tify which of several objects was in a cued
position within the scene.

He varied exposure duration (300, 500, and

700 msec), cueing order (before and after stimulus presentation), and
whether the scenes were presented in a coherent or jumbled state.

Jumb

lin g was employed to remove the effects of context by destroying the
information derivable from given sp atial rela tionship s among objects,
and was accomplished by cutting each picture into s ix parts, rearrang
ing them, and photographing them for presentation.

In addition, Bieder-

man presented the four response a lternatives eithe r before or after
the presentation of the stimulus.

As expected, recognition accuracy

was best at a ll durations when the cue and response alte rnative s were
presented beforehand and the scenes had been viewed in a coherent
state.

More importantly, he found a s ig n if ic a n t reduction in recogni

tion accuracy when scenes were jumbled, even when subjects knew what
to look for (alternatives before) and where (cue before).
These jumbling effects led Biederman to propose the existence of
two "functional u n its" (corresponding to information types) involved in
the perception of a scene . . . one based on individual objects, and
the other a more global schematic type.

In addition, he raised the

question of the location of context effects, which he supposed corres
ponded to schematic information, in the processing sequence.
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To examine further the impact of context on the perception of
pictures, Biederman, Glass, and Stacy (1973) studied the effects of ob
ject p ro b ab ility and coherency on a speeded search task.

Again, real-

world scenes were employed so that the meaningfulness normally encoun
tered would be maintained in the experimental setting.

Before viewing

the scene for 5 sec in either jumbled or coherent form, subjects viewed
an object which they were told might be in the scene they were about
to see.

When presented with the scene they were to press either a "yes"

or "no" finger key to indicate whether the object they had seen before
hand was contained in the scene.
was from the scene.

On one-third of the t r i a l s the object

On another third of the t r i a l s the object was not

in the scene but p ossib ly could have been (e.g., an automobile followed
by a street scene).

On the la s t third, objects were not contained in

the scene and th e ir inclusion was very improbable given the meaning of
the scene (e.g., an automobile presented before a kitchen scene).
Consistent with the 1972 study, jumbled stimuli required longer
response times than coherent scenes, with the difference being most
pronounced when the response category was "p o ssib le no."

Biederman,

et al. interpreted th e ir results in terms of a schema model of proces
sing, whereby an i n i t i a l h o l i s t i c or semantic interpretation is con
structed followed by a more detailed analysis.

Reaction times were

slowest under the jumbled "p o ssib le no" condition because the i n i t i a l
h o l i s t i c characterization, once achieved, did not allow the irmiediate recognition that the target object probably was not contained in
the scene presented.

The effect of jumbling in the "im possible no"

condition was to require additional time for the construction of this
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ove ra ll, semantic interpretation before detailed a n a ly sis and compari
son of the target object with those held in memory could be accom
plished.

Formation of this h o l i s t i c characterization, though delayed,

would be s u f f ic ie n t for rejection of the targeted object in th is condi
tion, and thus response times were fa ste r for "impossible no" when
compared to "p o ssib le no."
Important to the discussion of late r studies, Biederman, et al.
(1973) also noted that these effects may have resulted from some in 
terference with the object id e n tific a tio n process.

And, by proposing

that a h o l i s t i c characterization is dependent upon a physical context,
and that contextual information is the f i r s t to be extracted from a
pictured scene, these authors suggest that the effect of context in the
processing sequence is primary, and thus answer the question posed in
1972.
In a third study, Biederman, Rabinowitz, Glass, and Stacy (1974)
limited the exposure duration of the stimulus picture to a maximum of
300 msec so that the information extracted must result from a single
eye fix a tio n , and studied the a b i l i t y of subjects to select from among
two verbal labels the one that accurately represented the theme of a
p ic t o r i a l l y presented scene.

The stim uli used in the previous studies

were again used, as was jumbling because of the b e lie f that the theme
of a scene i s dependent upon the spatial relations among objects within
it .
In the f i r s t experiment reported, they studied the effects of
jumbling upon scene characterization.

Jumbling was hypothesized to

reduce subjects' conceptual accuracy (labeling) when labels were
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sim ila r ( i . e . , where objects would be of less informational value).
Scenes were presented fo r 20, 50, 100, and 300 msec.

Jumbling, label

s im ila r it y , and duration were a ll s ig n if ic a n t , as was the duration by
label s im ila r it y interaction.

The correct label was selected most often

when labels were d is s im ila r and when scenes were presented coherently.
In addition, these effects reached an asymptote by 100 msec, producing
a c e ilin g effect probably responsible for the sin g le s i g n if ic a n t in te r
action.
In the second experiment reported, the 1972 study was replicated
except that durations were now 20, 50, 100, an

300 msec, and h a lf of

the subjects made sele ctions from verbal response a lternatives rather
than p ic to ria l ones.

Scene version and duration were s ig n if ic a n t as

was the ir interaction, with coherent scenes re s u ltin g in a higher per
centage of correct object id e n t ific a tio n s at a ll durations, but with
the difference in performance on coherent versus jumbled forms less
pronounced at the longer durations.

This improvement of the jumbled

condition with increased exposure evidenced the impact of s p e c if ic ob
ject information in overcoming the interference effects of jumbling
as viewing progressed.
Again c it in g a schema model of processing, Biedernian, et al.
summarized the ir 1974 findings as re fle cting the extraction of two
kinds

of information simultaneously.

As sp e c ific object information

is sampled from a scene, a h o i i s t i c characterization including a thematic
component is constructed.

Both sp e c ific information and the more glo 

bal information of the h o l i s t i c schematic representation are available
a fte r b rie f 100 msec exposures, and each may be evidenced under the
appropriate task conditions.
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Taken together, Biederman's three studies demonstrate that the ef
fect of a coherent context ( i. e . , the natural spatial rela tionship s among
objects, and the rela tionship between objects and the scene in which
they are embedded) on recognizing objects from a scene i s a f a c i l i t a t i v e
one.
time.

F a c ilit a t io n is greatest when the scene is viewed for a very b rie f
And further, a coherent context helps the observer to semantically

label the scene.
It is appropriate at this point to c le a rly describe the theory of
picture perception which has emerged from Biederman's work.

B a sic a lly ,

i t is proposed that two d is t in c t types of information are ava ilab le to
the observer when viewing a picture.

The f i r s t type may be characterized

as detail or sp e c ific object information, probably acquired from foveal or
near-foveal vision. The second type of information is more global or gen
eral in nature, and is probably founded upon information gathered both
foveally and peripherally.

That i s , this global characterization of the

scene is constructed out of information concerning the ide ntity and spa
t ia l rela tionship of the scene's content.
The construction aspects of th is theory are of paramount importance
because the p e rc e ive r's re a liza tio n ( i . e . , awareness) and use of global
information is made possible by the existence of a schematic representa
tion of the scene constructed out of contextual and sp e c ific object in 
formation, and tempered with the knowledge gained from past visual ex
periences with such scenes and held in memory.

I f th is schematic repre

sentation is considered to be hierarchical and pyramid-like in structure
(see below) then general information about a scene i s most probably held
in the upper or higher levels of this representation. It is further a s
sumed that one's global interpretation of a scene contains a semantic
component.
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Both types of information about the pictured scene are acquired
simultaneously.

However, because there are innumerable pieces of de

ta ile d information p o te n tia lly available in any given scene, the com
plete processing ( i . e . , extraction, encoding, storage, etc.) of this
information type may begin simultaneously with the extraction of global
information but w ill take considerably longer.

Therefore, when a

scene is viewed for a very b rie f period of time contextual information
is the major informational source for the completion of most tasks.
Further, when context is jumbled or absent, the extraction of global
information in the form of a h o l i s t i c characterization or scheme is
interfered with, and the construction must then be based so le ly upon
detail or sp e c ific object information as a result.

With prolonged view

ing, perception is based more upon the increasing amount of detail in 
formation being acquired.

It might also be inferred that th is detail is

incorporated into the schematic representation of the scene so that
after prolonged viewing one's mental representation, and thus one's
perception, includes both a global understanding of the scene and an
accurate l i s t of i t s sp e c ific d e tail.

This theory may be termed a

"duplex" theory of picture perception because the information synony
mous with a perception i s of two types and is acquired simultaneously.
A theoretical work by Palmer (1975b) describes a possib le stru c 
ture fo r scene schema and in the process addresses how the global in
formation is integrated and interacts with the detailed information
gathered from a scene.

According to Palmer, a schema may be described

str u c tu r a lly as a set of rela tion sh ip s between various informational
e n t it ie s , with sets of information organized h ie ra rc h ic a lly .

These

e n titie s contain sense data concerning the physical properties of
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objects at the lower le v e ls, and e x ist as object schemata at higher
le ve ls.

A scene is thus represented str u c t u r a lly by the rela tionship

among various object schemata.

Objects are represented s t r u c tu r a lly

as a set of physical properties (e.g., size , color, orientation) occur
ring in a certain re la tion to one another.

Applied to the duplex

theory of picture perception, global information or a h o l i s t i c charac
te rization of a scene is analogous to that information contained at
the upper levels of a scene schema.

Detail information about an object

is represented as one of a colle ction of values involved in the charac
te rization of the object.
Noting that recognition is f a c ilit a t e d by a coherent context and
when the stimulus is well known rather than novel, Palmer asserts that
one's knowledge gained from past experience enters into the perceptual
process in the form of a propositional schema as described above.
The observer enters a scene with certain schemata primed to characterize
that scene.

The schema tentatively selected to f a c ilit a t e the scene's

interpretation is determined by the i n i t i a l input from the gaze of the
observer in the form of contextual information.

Detail information is

incorporated into the lower levels of whatever conceptual interpretation
has been adopted.

In this manner both types of information are pro

cessed simultaneously.

When contextual information is not available,

the selection of a conceptual interpretation is delayed and requires
the t r i a l and error processing of considerably more detail before
one's fina l perceptual interpretation of the scene i s possible.

When

a conceptual interpretation has been adopted, whether tentatively or
otherwise, i t causes the observer to seek or expect confirming sense
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data.

Contrary data may be misinterpreted or cause a d ifferent concep

tual interpretation (schema) to be adopted which is more consistent with
the current input.

Palmer's (1975b) structural and process a n alysis

re fle c ts the interaction between global and detail information which is
of primary import in understanding the perception of scenes.
In addition to the research by Biederman (1972; Biederman, et al.
1973; Biederman, et a l . 1974) presented above, support for the duplex
theory of picture perception in the form of evidence for the existence
and a c t iv it y of a h o l i s t i c characterization has come from a variety of
studies.
Potter (1975) tested the notion that the meaning of a pictured
scene is extracted very early in the viewing process.

She presented

subjects with either a target picture or a name for the target picture
and then gave them a recognition test.

Names given the target scenes

were b rie f descriptions of the major objects or events pictured (e.g.,
a boat).

During the test phase, pictures (the target and 15 d istra c -

tors) were exposed for 125, 167, 250, or 333 msec.

Potter reasoned

that to rapidly detect a target defined by it s meaning rather than a
sp e c ific visual pattern, the subject would have to semantically iden
t i f y the target scene as i t was presented during the test phase.

Her

re su lts showed that subjects were able to recognize a target scene as
rapidly and accurately when they knew only i t s name as when they had
viewed that scene in advance.

This finding held even at the shortest

exposure duration employed (125 msec).

As predicted by the duplex

theory of information extraction, a pictured scene is rapidly processed
to an abstract level of meaning.
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In a 1977 report, Biederman explored the semantic and syntactic
properties of schemata in the ir influence upon scene recognition.

Not

ing that schemata are effective within the f i r s t 100 msec of viewing a
scene, he developed a technique to violate sp e c ific rela tions between
an object and the scene within which i t is embedded.

The five relations

studied were support, in te rp o sitio n , p ro b a b ility , p osition , and size.
As the f i r s t two embody physical re s tra in ts on object-scene re la tio n 
sh ip s, they were considered syntactic components.

P ro b ab ility, p o si

tion, and size re fle c t referential meaning, and were thus referred to
as semantic components.
Employing lin e drawings of scenes on acetate, 247 scenes were
composed with the necessary v io la tio n s and xeroxed for presentation.
Scenes were presented for 150 msec followed by a cued object, and recog
n itio n was tested.

In looking at the error rates, targets v io la tin g

a relation were less accurately id e n tifie d (yie ld in g miss rates of
45% compared to 25% for target pictures with no v io la tio n s in re la 
t io n s), and there was a tendency for misses to increase when several
v io la tio n s were included.

There were no s ig n if ic a n t differences in

the error rates for v io la tio n s in syntactic as compared to semantic
relations.

In the v io la tion detection task reported, the cue preceded

the scenes and subjects were required to press either a "v io la t io n "
or "no v io la tio n " key.

Again, there was no difference between v io la 

tions detected based upon the type of v io la tio n , but as the number of
v io la tio n s increased from one to three, the speed of detection also
increased.

In a third task reported, subjects were to respond when

they detected a specified vio la tio n .

In th is task, reaction times
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were slowed when an irre le va n t vio la tio n was included, also suggestive
of the s im il a r it y of v io la tio n types.
C itin g the duplex model, Biederman interpreted his re su lts as
re fle c tin g the operation of a scene schema immediately upon the pre
sentation of the picture.

As the schema is i n i t i a l l y constructed from

the information gathered from a sin gle fixa tio n and prim arily based
upon the contextual information available, v io la tio n of th is context
via the destruction of sp e c ific relations also destroys or in h ib it s
the proper functioning of the schema.

Object id e n tific a tio n is made

more d i f f i c u l t (in terms of both time and accuracy) and the recognition
or detection of a given v io la tio n is confused.

A d d itio n a lly , the v io la 

tion id e n t ific a tio n task demonstrates that knowledge of physical or
syntactic rela tions does not precede or succeed knowledge of referen
t ia l or semantic rela tions . . . rather, both types of rela tions are
active in the construction of a h o l i s t i c characterization of the scene.
The Loftus and Mackworth (1978) study cited in the previous sec
tion also supports the idea that contextual information and it s re
sultant h o l i s t i c characterization is available to the observer early
in the processing of pictures.

Their subjects fixated immediately

upon what they termed "inform ative" objects.

As noted, what defined

an object as informative was the context of the picture and the sub
j e c t 's past h istory.

Therefore, for subjects in th e ir study to se

lect informative over uninformative objects for the focus of atten
tion required that those subjects immediately process contextual in 
formation and form a h o l i s t i c characterization of the scene.

Loftus

and Mackworth suggested that th is process allows the observer to
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assim ilate these improbable objects as part of the currently viewed
scene with the scene schema carried into the situ a tio n remaining other
wise unaltered.

After the f i r s t fixa tio n when the h o l i s t i c characteri

zation is f i r s t generated, a comparative process begins whereby schema
generated expectancies are tested against incoming sense data.

This

process occupies the remainder of the ob server's picture processing
time.
Support for the functioning of a h o l i s t i c characterization in
picture perception may also be found in Antes (1977) investigation of
recognition and lo c a liz a tio n accuracy in two experiments.

In both

experiments photographs were divided into eight sections and rated by
an independent group of subjects for th e ir informativeness ( i. e . , the
amount of information the section contained re la tiv e to the entire
p ic t u r e ) .
In the f i r s t experiment, pictures were presented for 100 msec
followed by one of the sections serving as a probe or target, and sub
jects were to decide i f the probe section had been part of the stimu
lus picture and assign confidence ratings to th e ir decisions.

Probe sec

tions rated as highly informative were better recognized than those
rated low informative, and sections occupying a central position in the
stimulus picture were also better recognized.

Using a signal

detection a n a ly sis of errors i t was discovered that low informative
probes yielded more fa lse alarms and high informative sections yielded
more misses.

Assuming fewer id e n tifia b le objects in the low in f o r 

mative sections (Antes & Stone 1975), i t was probably necessary
for subjects probed with these sections to rely upon whatever schema
might have been derived from the contextual information in a single
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glance, and thus subjects would be more l ik e ly to respond p o sit iv e ly
when there was no match between probe section and picture.

However,

when sections were high in informativeness, and thus contained id e n t i
fia b le objects, such confusions were le ss li k e ly , and negative responses
when there was a match dominated.

This interpretation is e n tire ly

consistent with the duplex model, and further suggests that the sub
j e c t 's schema or h o l i s t i c characterization of the scene w ill be auto
matic in it s effect upon recognition responses, u t i l i z i n g whatever in 
formation is available ( i . e . , i t i s not a voluntary process that is
engaged only when s u f f ic ie n t information e x ists to avoid most error).
In the second study reported, subjects were shown the stimulus
picture for either 100 or 500 msec followed by a probe of one of the
sections.

Subjects were to indicate on a 2 x 4 grid where in the p ic

ture the probe section had been located.

Both high informative and

c e ntrally located sections were better localized.

While correct

responses were made only 31% (100 msec) and 38% (500 msec) of the time,
incorrect responses were often made to adjacent grid areas suggesting
that the general location of the section had indeed been determined.
As subjects tend to fixate the highly informative sections of the p ic
ture f i r s t , th is overall poor lo c a liz a tio n accuracy prompted Antes to
speculate that the underlying processes responsible for recognition
accuracy and lo c a liz a tio n may be different.

I t seems p la u sib le that

detail information greatly enhances recognition performance but only
in d ir e c tly aids the lo c a liz a tio n of an object by i n i t i a t i n g or ac
tiv a t in g a schema of the scene.

The spatial information necessary

to lo c a lize objects is tied to th is schematization which functions
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prim arily on past experience in early viewing and u t iliz e s contextual
information as viewing progresses*

Until the schema has had time to

evolve and gather th is external spatial information, lo c a l i z a b i 1ity re
mains at a low level compared to recognizability.
Loftus and Bell (1975) designed a study to investigate the extent
to which picture recognition is based upon sp e c ific versus global in 
formation.

Subjects were shown 60 pictures followed by 120 pictures

(including the o rig in a l 60) as part of a yes-no recognition task.

The

pictures were either photographs, embellished lin e drawings, or unembellished lin e drawings.

Five exposure durations were employed:

100, 250, 350, and 500 msec.

60,

The relevant findings were that both the

amount of detail contained in the picture and the exposure duration
were s ig n if ic a n t in the ir effects upon recognition.

Accuracy improved

with increased viewing time, and photographs were better recognized
than embellished line drawings, and these better recognized than unembellishe d line drawings.

These findings were bolstered by consistent

confidence rankings and subjective reports.

Subjects were more co n fi

dent when more detail was available, and reported more often that
th e ir recognition judgments had been based upon sp e c ific detail rather
than on feelings of fa m ilia r ity .
Loftus and Bell proposed that the additional detail afforded the
observer in the richer (defined in an informational sense) stim uli
provided a better opportunity to encode a sp e c ific d e ta il, with the
re su lt of such encoding being a "quantuum leap" in the availab le glo
bal information.

This is consistent with the duplex model which pro

poses that recognition w ill be best under conditions where both
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sp e c if ic and contextual information are available.

While i t might seem

reasonable to expect that i f recognition of b r ie fly presented scenes is
based predominantly on global information then accuracy should be
equivalent among the three types of stim uli used in th is experiment
since a ll afforded global information, the obtained resu lts appear even
more reasonable when i t is remembered that both sp e c ific and global i n 
formation are availab le to the observer arid incorporated into the schema
representing a scene.

The scene having the most evolved or embellished

schema w ill be more accurately recognized than one containing fewer
s p e c if ic s , therefore the better recognition of photographs in the Loftus and Bell study.

The important contribution here is the emphasis

upon sp e c ific information in the processing of pictures . . .

an em

phasis which is not at the expense of the part played by more global
information in that same processing.
The inte ractive nature of sp e c ific and contextual information in
the recognition of pictures was also evidenced in the study of Metz
ger (unpublished doctoral d isse rta tio n , 1976) cited e a rlie r.

His finding

that medium informative sections of pictures were better recognized
than high informative sections could be predicted on the basis of the
content of medium informative sections.

These sections contained

both sp e c ific object information and contextual information, and as
such contributed more to the scene schema than high informative sec
tions where only sp e c if ic information was available.
Support for and refinements of the duplex theory of picture per
ception may also be found in the study of context, which evidences
the impact of contextual information in the formation of a h o l i s t i c
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characterization of scenes necessary for the ir interpretation and per
ception.

As the current inve stiga tion i s i t s e l f prim arily concerned

with the study of context, an examination of these studies w ill be pre
sented separately in the next section.
In concluding this section, i t might be noted that the present
study adheres to the duplex theory as set forth above.

When an ob

server i s confronted with a scene, both sp e c ific and global informa
tion are available and are active in creating his or her perceptual
experience.

As indicated in th is and the previous section, detailed

information is acquired through the process of foveal sampling of the
scene's highly informative sections (and medium informative sections to
the extent that they contain readily id e n tifia b le objects).

Global

information is gathered p rim arily from the context of the scene via
peripheral sampling of both medium and low informative areas, but is
also based upon the re su lts of comparative operations which have occurred
previously and involve the relational c h a ra c te ristic s of objects and
scenes.

These two types of information interact with each other over

the course of viewing and perceiving the scene.

I n i t i a l viewing ac

tivates a comparison between expectations held in a schematically
structured memory and those acquired from contextual information with
incoming detail information.

The outcome of th is comparison process

e n ta ils that future scans of the scene be directed to areas that
might confirm these expectations or resolve any c o n flic ts between ex
pectations and input.

As in the c yc lic a l processing advocated by

Neisser (1976) and Hochberg (1970, 1978), the sp e c ific information
gathered from these discrete searches w ill modify the scene's concep
tu a liza tio n , leading to altered expectations, a lte rin g the outcome of
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various comparisons, and ultimately changing the conceptualization of
the scene synonymous with i t s perception.
Contexts Effects in Picture Perception
What are the effects of contextual information on the perception
of a scene and the objects embedded within i t ?

Despite the e ffo rts of

many in v e stig a to rs, th is question remains largely unanswered.

What i s

known concerning context effects in the perception of pictures has
emerged p rim arily from the work of Biederman (1972, 1977; Biederman,
Glass, & Stacy 1973; Biederman, Rabinowitz, Glass & Stacy 1974) and
others to be presented in th is section who have studied the perception
of pictures d ir e c tly ( i . e . , have used pictures as stim u li).

However,

relevant findings have also come from in ve stiga tors employing non
p ic to ria l stim uli (e.g., words, geometric configurations) and deserve
mention here.
A pioneering study into the effects of context on the recogni
tion of words was conducted by Tulving and Gold (1963).

A total of

three experiments were reported, a ll stemming from the basic premise
that the amount of stimulus information required by a subject to recog
nize a word varies inversely with the amount of contextual informa
tion provided.

In the f i r s t experiment, context length (8, 4, 2, 1,

or 0 words preceding the target word) and the congruity of context
(incongruous contexts were incompatible with the target word) were
examined.

An example of Tulving and G old's stim uli is the following:

"Three people were k il le d today in a t e r rib le highway COLLISION"
(p. 321), where the word in uppercase le tte rs served as the target.
Using the target word "RASPBERRY" within that sentence would
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constitute an example of an incongruous context.

Ten target words were

tested under the various combinations re su ltin g from the two variables,
and length of tachistoscopic exposure necessary for a ve ridical report
of the target word was the dependent variable.
Results c le arly showed that increasing the length of congruous
context f a c ilit a t e s word recognition, whereas increasing the length of
incongruous context interferes with recognition.

Experiments 2 and 3

demonstrated a strong monotonic rela tionship between contextual in f o r 
mation and length of context, and between congruity and length of con
text.

In addition, they established that the dominant relationship

was between context congruity and context length.

I t was therefore

concluded that i t is not the amount of contextual information but it s
relevance that accounts for the effects of context on word recognition.
These re su lts also c le a rly implicate contextual information in the
activation of expectancies or hypotheses about the nature of the
sp e c if ic stim uli being observed.
In a study designed prim arily to examine the issue of se ria l
versus parallel processing (see Estes & Taylor 1966; Sperling 1967)
Reicher (1969) measured recognition performance for one or two le t 
te rs, fo u r-le tte r words, and fo u r-le tte r non-words.

After tachisto-

scopic presentation of the stimulus followed by a 100 msec masking
fie ld , each subject was required to select the le tte r they had seen
in the stimulus presentation from a pair of le tte rs (a ll le tte rs in
the alphabet were sampled).

In addition to stimulus type, Reicher

varied exposure duration (6Q, 75, and 90 percent performance levels for
a given ind ividua l) and cue presentation (response a lternatives were
presented either before or after stimulus presentation).
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The major findings were that performance on one word was better
than performance on either one le tte r or one quadrigram, and that per
formance on two words was superior to that on eithe r two le tte rs or
two quadrigrams.

This trend was unaltered by presenting the alterna

tives beforehand or by increasing the exposure duration.

In addition,

confidence rankings by the subjects were consistent with these find
ings; subjects were more confident on words than on the other types of
material.

This "word su p e rio rity effect" provides obvious support

for the notion that information i s processed in p a ra lle l.

I t also

suggests that what i s extracted from the stimulus presentation is the
meaning of the stimulus, with the conceptualization fa ste r for words
than for le tte rs alone or for quadrigrams in R e iche r's study.
In 1972, Wheeler conducted a study that paralleled in essential
detail of design the study of Reicher (1969).

The major difference

in paradigm consisted of the addition of several controls in the ma
te ria l used as stim uli (e.g., positional cerainty, te sting of le tte rs
that also function as words in the English language).

The persistence

of the word su p e rio rity effect was evidenced, as Wheeler obtained re
su lts identical to R e ic h e r's, and to a greater degree, 10% compared to
87o su p e rio rity of words over le tte rs and quadrigrams.
Wheeler suggested that the recognition of words cannot be accom
plished via independent le tte r recognition processes; rather, there
must e x is t an interaction among the le tte rs of a word such that a con
text results.

It is not a contextual noise or narrowing effect, as

poor performance on the quadrigrams indicated, but the context as
meaningful information relevant to it s constituent parts that i s
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f a c i l i t a t i v e in the recognition task.

A d d itio n a lly , Wheeler proposed

that his re su lts are amenable to a simultaneous constraints model of
processing, which he described as an i n i t i a l parallel feature extrac
tion stage followed by a second stage based on information gathered
during the f i r s t and functioning to locate, construct and encode the
stimulus.

The consistency of th is proposal with the duplex theory

cited e a r lie r i s evident.
An in ve stiga tion conducted by Weisstein and Harris (1974) ex
amined the a b i l i t y to recognize lin e segments embedded in various types
of context.

Four line segments d iffe rin g in orientation and location

within the visual fie ld were presented at one of three exposure dura
tions ranging from 5 to 44 msec.

For a given t r i a l , one of these lin e s

was shown together with one of s i x contextual patterns.

The su b je c t's

task was to view the stimulus (followed by a 100 msec mask) and iden
t i f y which of the line segments had been presented.
The main finding was that when a line segment was part of a con
figu ra tion (context) that appeared unitary and three-dimensional i t
was better recognized than when presented within a f l a t , non-meaningful
pattern configuration.

Weisstein and H arris suggested that th is re su lt

with non-verbal stim uli i s analogous to the word su p e rio rity effect
found by Reicher (1969) and may be viewed as evidence for the efficacy
of contextual information, e sp e c ia lly meaningful contextual information,
in the rapid perception of stim uli that are more spatial in nature than
words or le tte rs.
In a se rie s of five experiments, Pomerantz, Sager, and Stoever
(1977) investigated what they termed the "configural su p e rio rity ef
fe c t."

This effect is analogous to the word su p e rio rity effect, but
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a rise s when stim uli are geometric configurations rather than le tte rs or
words.

In a ll the experiments reported, line segments of d if fe rin g

orie ntation s, lengths, p o sitio n s, and curvatures were used as stim uli.
In Experiment 1, subjects were presented with either a sin g le
parenthesis (no context condition) or a pair of parentheses (context
condition) for 200 msec.
served as the target.

When presented as a p air, only one parenthesis

The targets were varied to face eithe r l e f t or

rig h t (open or closed p o sitio n ), and the subject had to make a forced
choice as to the direction of the target.

A na lysis of reaction times

showed a s ig n if ic a n t difference, with times for the context condition
being the fastest.
In the second experiment, Pomerantz, et al. minimized memorial
involvement by presenting subjects with an array of 16 stim u li, four
of which were d iffe re n t from the remaining 12, and required subjects
to indicate the location of the disparate quadrant in the array.

Ad

d it io n a lly , th is experiment controlled for the symmetry, spacing, and
mirror-imageness of the stim uli.

Results indicated that the configural

su p e rio rity effect persisted with the additional controls.

Also, i t

was found that arrays containing additional irrelevant contextual in 
formation led to poorer performance.

Thus contextual information may

f a c ilit a t e or in h ib it the speed of lo c a liza tio n depending upon its
relevance.
In the third experiment reported, the discrim inations involved
were of a broader ecological sample (e.g., orientation of curved line
segments, position of a line rela tive to a fixed point, line length),
and arrays were reduced in size from 16 to 4 elements so that in d i
vidual elements or features might be enlarged (display size was kept
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constant).

A n a ly sis of reaction time measures showed that some of the

discrim inations were fa ste r when made under context conditions, while
others were slower.
In Experiment 4, subjects did not know in advance of presentation
whether they would be viewing the stimulus in context or without.
Stimuli were two arrays from Experiment 3, one with context and one with
out.

Again, the configural su p e rio rity effect was evidenced and d is 

criminations were faste r under context conditions.
The la st experiment Pomerantz, et all. reported was concerned with
the se r ia l versus parallel nature of processing from geometric configura
tions.

Subjects were required to determine whether there were any d is 

parate elements embedded in an array ( i . e „ , a visual search task),
under no context, good context (highly d is t in c t and id e n tifia b le con
textual elements), or poor context (vague and complex contextual ele 
ments) conditions.

Array size (2, 4, or 6 elements), presence or ab

sence of d isp a rity , and location of d isp a rity within the array were
also varied.

These la s t two variables were for control purposes only

and were not analyzed.

Reaction times were best for good context,

followed by no context, and large r arrays were responded to more slowly.
These findings were confounded by the interaction between the two v a r i
ables and further a nalysis revealed that array size affected only the
detection of stim uli embedded in poor contextual arrangements.

Further,

no configural su p e rio rity effect was obtained when the good contextual
arrays were compared to those without context.

However, Pomerantz,

et a l . proposed that this la s t finding may have indeed reflected a
context effect in that the arrays without context, when taken as a
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whole, tended to form schematicized representations of le tte rs of the
alphabet, and were probably responded to as such.

I t was thus suggested

that parallel processing had been evidenced.
The major conclusions to be drawn from the work of Pomerantz,
et al. (1977) i s that context improves d isc r im in a b ility under certain
conditions and, on the basis of the oddity and search tasks which
minimized the influence of memory, context has it s effect on the per
ceptual rather than the post-perceptual processing of geometric con
figu ra tions.

The authors proposed an emergent-features explanation of

the effects of context on perception, suggesting that the emergent
features are more novel than the elementary features, and are thus
more discrim inable than features presented as targets without context.
The inconsistent effect of context in these studies i s probably due
to the f a ilu re of a recognizable emergent feature to result from every
contextual arrangement.

Translated into the terms of the duplex

theory, not every contextual arrangement results in the activation of
a fam iliar conceptualization; the more foreign the contextual and
sp e c ific information, the more active construction necessitated at
the time of viewing for a coherent and meaningful experience to re
su lt.

In proposing these emergent features in the perception of a

superordinate sp atial configuration, Pomerantz, et al. imply a direct
perceptual access to th is higher order information, a notion e n tire ly
consistent with the duplex theory presented e a rlie r.
From these experiments employing non-pictorial stim u li, i t is
evident that contextual information plays an important role in the
perception of a broad range of stim uli as measured by a variety of
tasks.

And while th is review has not been an exhaustive one, the
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re su lts of the studies presented here indicate that information derived
from the context of a stimulus can either f a c i li t a t e or in h ib it perfor
mance on a task depending upon it s relevance and meaning.

Taken as a

whole, these studies suggest that a higher order conceptualization of
the stimulus may be derived prim arily from the contextual information
at hand, and that such context i s an active informational source in
the total processing sequence.

Consistent evidence has come from

studies employing pictures (e.g., photographs, line drawings) as stimul
In 1975 (a), Palmer investigated the effects of context on the
recognition of objects from lin e drawings of scenes.

Subjects were

f i r s t shown a s lid e containing a contextual scene or a blank for 2
sec.

Following a 1300 msec delay they were shown a second s lid e con

taining the target object for a duration of 20, 40, 60, or 120 msec.
Subjects were to respond by w riting the name of the object perceived,
and to assign a confidence ranking to the ir judgment.

For the f i r s t

s lid e viewed, context was eithe r absent, appropriate, or inappropriate.
Within the inapporpriate context condition there were two subcondi
tions:

one where the following target object was sim ila r in shape

and size to an object appropriate to that scene, and one where i t was
d is s im ila r along these dimensions.
The principal finding was that accuracy of recognition was
highest when the target was preceded by an appropriate context, less
so when preceded by a blank s lid e , and poorest when i t followed an
inappropriate context.

Furthermore, performance in the "inappropriate

context— sim ila r target" condition was in f e r io r to that in the "inappro
priate context— d is s im ila r target" condition.
tion also enhanced performance.

Increased exposure dura

These findings evidence the importance

of both contextual information and sp e c ific physical c h a ra c te ristic s
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as they influence a su b je c t's response.

When subjects had contextual

information with which to conceptualize object information they were
better able to recognize or recall objects than i f no contextual informa
tion was available.

I f inappropriate to that in which the object is

normally encountered, that same contextual information may re su lt in
an incorrect characterization and thereby give r is e to a non-veridical
response.

The incorrect characterization of an object is more l ik e ly

when i t p h ysic a lly resembles an object appropriate to another concep
tu a liza tio n , invoked here by an inappropriate context.

That the in-

a p p rop ria te -d issim ila r target condition resulted in better performance
demonstrates that the conceptualization of an object is based upon
physical or sp e c ific detail as well as upon context.

The improved per

formance with increased exposure represents the impact of an increasing
store of sp e c ific information about the object with longer viewing.
A study reported by Antes and Metzger (in press) looked at the
effects of context upon the recognition and lo c a liz a tio n of objects in
pictures.

Two experiments were reported, the f i r s t being an extension

of the works of Biederman (1972) and Palmer (1975a).
In Experiment 1, subjects were presented with 100 msec d isplays
of eithe r line drawings containing s i x objects embedded in the context
of a scene, or drawings of those same objects in an array without the
background context.

This allowed for the reduction of context (rather

than disrup ting i t as Biederman had done) and the presentation of con
textual and object information within the same exposure (improving
upon Palmer's design).

Stimulus construction also allowed the objects

in the array to maintain the same spatial rela tion sh ip s as they had in
the ir contextual presentation.

Following the stimulus presentation,
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subjects were required to select the object that they had seen in the
display in a four a lternative forced-choice recognition task.

The a l 

ternatives were either consistent or inconsistent with the context of
the scene in which the target object was embedded.

Location of target

objects within the disp lay was controlled for by randomly assigning
near and far objects from each stimulus to two t r i a l series.
Antes and Metzger found that target objects were selected from
inconsistent response a lternatives most accurately and that target ob
jects near the center of the disp lay were recognized better than those
located in the periphery.

A na lysis of the interaction between context

and d istra c to r consistency revealed that recognition was most accurate
when objects were presented in context and the d istra c to rs were i n 
consistent with that context.

Context also interacted with location,

showing that objects presented without background context were recog
nized better i f they were located in the central portions of the display.
Antes and Metzger proposed that these findings demonstrate that context
does not simply improve recognition for embedded objects; rather, i t
allows subjects to bias th e ir responses in favor of objects appropriate
to the scene.

Context thus functions prim arily to enhance the general

characterization of the scene and f a c i li t a t e s object recognition only
in d ire c tly via infe re ntial processes u t i l i z i n g information contained
in that characterization.

Their re su lts further indicate that con

textual information is not the major informational source for the recog
n ition of c e ntrally presented objects.
In the second experiment reported, the effect of context on the
a b i l i t y to lo c a lize objects was investigated.

The stim uli and their

presentation was identical to that in Experiment 1.

The task of the
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subject was to locate a cut-out of the target object within a frame
equated in size to the stimulus disp lay in the same position i t occu
pied in the stimulus presentation.

Analyzing the difference between

the su b je c t's p ositioning of the target object and it s true location,
and the difference between the distance of the target from the p ic tu re 's
center and the distance of the subject’s position in g and center, they
found that context was a s ig n if ic a n t factor . . . subjects in the con
text condition were better able to accurately localize the objects.
The true location of the target object (central versus peripheral) also
had an effect, with subjects placing near objects further from the cen
ter of the picture than they tru ly were, and inversely placing p e ri
pherally located objects close r to the center.
Antes and Metzger concluded that context f a c ilit a t e s the location
of objects by providing information used to construct a representation
of the scene which serves as a "frame of reference" for the spatial
orientation of objects.
A study conducted by Antes, Penland and Metzger (manuscript in
preparation) compared the effects of context on the recognition of both
usual and unusual objects presented in pictures.

For comparative pur

poses, the conditions of Antes and Metzger (in press) were replicated,
except the target objects were now inappropriate to the context in
which they were embedded.

The su b je c t's task was to ide ntify the t a r 

get object from among four response alte rnative s that were either con
s iste n t or inconsistent with the context of the picture.

Because of

the unusual character of the target objects, none of the objects a v a i l 
able for selection in the inconsistent d istra c to r condition were related
to the context of the picture.

To the extent that contextual
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information i s u t iliz e d in the recognition of objects, th is condition
was expected to y ie ld the poorest performance.

Preliminary a nalysis

showed that unusual objects were more poorly recognized when presented
in context than when presented without background context.

As expected,

unusual objects were recognized at chance levels when subjects were
tested under the inconsistent d istra c to r condition.

However, poorest

performance resulted when the d istra c to rs were consistent with the con
text of the picture; a re su lt consistent with the suggestion of Antes
and Metzger (in press) that contextual information may bias responses
in addition to a lte rin g the su b je c t's perception and conceptualization.
Subjecting the combined re su lts of th is task and those of Antes
and Metzger's f i r s t experiment to analysis revealed that object usual
ness interacted with both picture context and d istra c to r consistency.
The recognition of both usual and unusual objects was approximately
equal in the no context condition, whereas the recognition of usual
objects was s i g n i f i c a n t l y above chance in the context condition and
the recognition of unusual objects was s ig n if ic a n t ly below chance in
the context condition.

These findings c le arly demonstrate that the

a b i l i t y to recognize an object is f a c ilit a t e d by contextual information
i f derived from an appropriate context and inhibited by information
gathered from an inappropriate or atypical context.

Antes, Penland,

and Metzger (manuscript in preparation) suggest that contextual in f o r 
mation is active during both the encoding and response periods in a
study such as this one, affecting the encoding of sp e c ific object in 
formation such that only usual objects are encoded, and a lt e rin g the
su b je c t's response such that i t is directed toward objects consistent
with the context of the picture.
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Mandler and her colleagues have conducted a se rie s of studies
(Mandler & Parker 1976; Mandler & Johnson 1976; Mandler & Ritchey 1977)
in v e stig a tin g the effects of context on the recognition of various
types of p ic to ria l information.

Mandler and Parker (1976) presented

four scenes ( lin e drawings) which were either organized (objects were
in th e ir normal spatial re la tio n sh ip to each other and horizon markings
were evident) or unorganized ( e sse n tia lly jumbled with horizon markings
absent).

Subjects viewed the pictures for 20 sec each with a 10 sec

interval between pictures.

They were then given an immediate recogni

tion test followed by a lo c a liza tio n task with the objects selected in
the recognition task being given to the subject to locate within a
frame.

Mandler and Parker varied the size , orientation, and appearance

of the pictured objects to y ie ld an eight alternative forced-choice
recognition test for each of the objects in each of the pictures.
None of the three va ria tio n s employed resulted in d iffe re n tia l
performance on the recognition test for organized versus unorganized
scenes.

Apparently the context of the picture had l i t t l e effect on

such descriptive information.

A nalysis did reveal that picture organi

zation had a s ig n if ic a n t effect upon lo c a liz a tio n performance; objects
in organized pictures were localized more accurately than those viewed
in unorganized pictures.

Mandler and P arker's findings suggest that

contextual information is more important to the spatial representation
of objects than for their subsequent recognition.

Keeping in mind the

20 sec exposure duration used in this study, such a finding would be
expected given the amount of time available to gather sp e c if ic object
information.

Both detail and more global information would be
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availab le in s u f f ic ie n t quantity after 20 sec and the former would be
a far more accurate source for making the discrim ination required in
the recognition task, whereas the la tte r would be more useful in the
lo c a liza tio n task, probably because lo c a liz in g an object within a
scene requires some rudimentary characterization of the scene as a
whole (in the re la tio n sh ip s among objects in the scene, including their
spatial re la tio n sh ip ), and th is is p recisely the character of global
information.
Also in 1976, Mandler and Johnson employed a same-different
recognition task in the comparison of organized versus unorganized p ic
tures, and the ir effects upon the type of information encoded.

Their

stim uli were 10 line drawings of scenes presented for either 5, 20, or
60 sec (held constant for a given subject).

The a lternatives in the

recognition task were pictures identical to those used as stim u li, but
having undergone one of five transformations:

an object was moved,

two objects in the picture exchanged places, an object was deleted, an
object was replaced by another object of the same size and shape but
conceptually d iffe re n t, or an object was replaced with an object of
the same conceptual c lass but d iffe re n t in size and shape.
After converting the ir data to signal detection measures, Mandler
and Johnson found that h it rates varied s i g n i f i c a n t l y for exposure
duration only, with longer presentations re su ltin g in higher h it rates.
A na lysis of correct rejections revealed more correct rejections for
organized scene versions when two objects had been exchanged, and for
unorganized versions when an object was moved or deleted.

The other

two transformations employed had no effect upon correct rejections when
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comparing organized versus unorganized presentations.

As with h its,

correct rejections increased at longer exposure times.

A nalysis of

response latency revealed that a ll responses were more rapid to organized
versus unorganized pictures with 5 sec exposure, whereas responses were
slower for organized pictures for durations of 20 and 60 sec.
From the signal detection a n a ly sis comes evidence that context
may be used prim arily in the rejection of incorrect a lte rna tive s,
rather than as a basis for a direct id e n tifyin g response.

This l o g ic a lly

follows from the contention that contextual information tends to be
global in character and, therefore, w ill not be useful to the observer
in discrim inating detail but w ill allow gross discrim ination of the
kind necessary to reject incorrect a lternatives.

As noted, hits did

increase s i g n i f i c a n t l y with increased exposure duration, demonstrating
the impact of an ever-increasing pool of detail or sp e c ific informa
tion.

The effect of context in detecting exchanges between objects

suggests that i t plays a more important role in s p a t ia lly representing
objects in the scene, while the meaningful q uality associated with the
characterization presumably derived from contextual information in h ib its
the detection of changes in object density within the picture.

The

varying effects of scene organization in combination with exposure dura
tion is more d i f f i c u l t to account for.

At the 5 sec duration, the

expected advantage of context i s evidenced, while at longer durations
latencies for the no context conditions were shorter.

Handler and

Johnson suggest that detections were made equally fa st at a ll exposure
durations, but that during the longer exposures subjects spent more
time exploring organized pictures subsequent to the detection than
they would spend exploring pictures without context.
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Mandler and Ritchey (1977) presented the ir subjects with eight
slid e s of either organized or unorganized pictures for 10 sec each.
After viewing a ll eight s lid e s , they were to respond by making a samed ifferent judgment and assign a confidence ranking to th e ir decision.
Recognition te sts were given immediately, one day late r, one week
later, and after one month's time, however only the immediate recogni
tion test i s pertinent to th is discussion.

Eight different tr a n sfo r 

mations and su b stitu tio n s were made on the pictures used as d istra c to rs
in the same-different recognition test.

The relevant finding is that

picture organization had a dramatic effect upon responses requiring
information about the spatial location of objects.

This finding is

consistent with those of the e a r lie r Mandler studies (Mandler & Parker
1976; Mandler & Johnson 1976) and with the results of Antes and Metzger
(in press) in showing that contextual information is heavily involved
in representing the location of objects within a scene.
The studies presented thus fa r lead to several conclusions regard
ing the effects of context on the perception of pictured information.
When l i t t l e sp e c ific object information i s available ( i . e . , when p ic 
tures are viewed for a very b rie f time or during the i n i t i a l viewing
of a picture for a prolonged time) the information derived from the
context of a scene i s the primary basis for an observer’s response to
questions concerning the scene's content.

I f an unusual or unexpected

object i s placed in the scene i t s recognition under these circumstances
is u n lik e ly, e sp e c ia lly i f i t i s sim ila r in size and shape to objects
normally occupying that p osition in the scene.

With prolonged viewing,

the increasing store of detail information is relie d upon to answer
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questions about sp e c ific object information, and with this as the basis
for a response, unusual objects are quickly recognized.

Viewing time

does not affect the impact of contextual information as i t affects
responses to questions regarding the location of objects within the
scene to this extent.

Both i n i t i a l l y and with prolonged viewing, con

text is the foundation for a spatial representation of the location
of objects embedded in a pictured scene.

As the contextual information

available to the observer also increases with increased exposure, this
sp atial representation becomes more accurate with time but context re
mains i t s major informational source.
In a somewhat d iffe re n t approach to the study of context, Fried
man (in press) has invoked the notion of "frames" to account for the
processing of scene information.

Noting that context must be considered

to encompass both internal (memorial) and external (physical) constraints,
she argued that picture perception is most probably a "top-down" a f
f a i r ( i . e . , ac q u isitio n of information from the environment in accor
dance with some in te rn a lly held conceptualization or hypothesis) when
the object of the process is fa m ilia r or expected in relation to it s
context, and that i t is the re su lt of an interaction of top-down and
"bottom-up" ( i . e . , the a cquisition of environmental information in
accordance with the constraints inherent in the environment i t s e l f
without prejudice from any conceptualization held by the observer)
processing when the object i s unfam iliar or unexpected.

(See Lindsay

& Norman, 1977 for a d iscussion of data- and conceptually-driven pro
cessing in perception.)

Further, she proposed that objects may be

c l a s s if ie d with respect to a given context.

An "o b lig a to ry " object
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is one that is c lose ly related to the theme or meaning of a scene
(e.g., a re frig e ra to r in a kitchen scene), and i t functions to activate
or insta ntia te the frame that represents that scene (in th is instance,
a kitchen frame).

A "nonobligatory" object is one that is not d ire c tly

related to the meaning of a scene (e.g., a pot of geraniums in a
kitchen), but is not atypical or unexpected in that context.

Nonobliga-

tory objects are not s u f f ic ie n t to insta ntia te a scene's frame represen
tation.
Both obligatory and nonobligatory objects are properly c la s s if ie d
as arguments (informational units) for a given frame, and both types of
objects may be inferred or activated by default in the absence of sense
data to the contrary.

Friedman proposed that because obligatory ob

jects are diagnostic regarding the frames for which they are an argu
ment, they should be processed in a top-down fashion.

Nonobligatory

objects w ill re fle c t a more interactive processing because they are not
d e fin itiv e with respect to the scene of which they are a part.

D if 

fe re ntia ting obligatory and nonobligatory objects from "unexpected"
ones, she suggested that the la t te r represents a "wierd" element and
is processed by being attached to, but not integrated with, the scene's
frame.

Typical objects y ie ld object frames that e a s ily coalesce to

form larger, more global frame systems which represent the scene,
whereas e x istin g unexpected or atypical objects, and the ir corresponding
object frames, remain differentiated.

Consequently, the level of detail

available to an observer w ill be far greater for objects that are un
expected and whose frames are not arguments of the scene frame.
Theoretically then, transformations on objects (e.g., Handler & Johnson
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1976) should have d ifferent effects on recognition performance depend
ing upon whether they are made on obligatory, nonobligatory, or unex
pected objects.
Friedman (in press) tested this hypothesis by presenting subjects
with s i x embellished (25-35 objects per picture) line drawings of realworld scenes for 30 sec each.

The topic or theme of each picture was

announced verbally to the subject p rio r to it s presentation, and eye
movements were recorded while subjects scanned the scenes.

After view

ing the entire stimulus set, subjects were given a two-alternative
forced-choice recogntiion test.

Every object in each of the s ix p ic 

tures was rated independently for it s likelihood of occurrence within
the picture, with high, medium, and low ratings corresponding to o b lig a 
tory, nonobligatory, and unexpected objects, respectively.

Type

changes ( i . e . , replacing an object with another of the same size and
shape but conceptually d iffe re n t), token changes ( i. e . , replacing an
object with an object of the same conceptual c la ss but d iffe re n t in
size and shape), deleting an object, and exchanging the position of
two objects within a picture were the four transformations carried out
upon objects in the pictures used as d istra c to rs in the recognition
test.

A d d itio n a lly , the type changes were made on objects that were

rated either high, medium, or low in terms of like lihoo d of occurrence.
Analysis of mean fix a tio n duration (which Friedman assumed cor
responded to the time taken to encode an object) across subjects re
vealed that 28% to 52% of the variation was accounted for by an o b je ct's
rated p rob ab ility of occurrence, when considering f i r s t fixa tion.
L i k e ! ih o o d a c co u n te d f o r between 14% and 38% on the se co n d f i x a t i o n ,
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and between 6% and 24% on subsequent fix a tio n s (pooled).

Examining

f i r s t , second, and third fix a tio n s as they interacted with like lihoo d,
Friedman found that high and medium objects were consiste ntly viewed
for shorter times than low objects, with the difference decreasing from
342 msec on the f i r s t fixa tion to 73 msec on the third.

A na lysis of

the proportion of times a d istra c to r was correctly rejected given that
the object transformed had been fixated showed that d istra c to rs were
correctly rejected most often when the change involved an object with
a low p ro b a b ility of occurrence, least often when the rated object was
highly probable, with objects rated medium in like lihoo d intermediate
between the other two.

It was also found that the three type tra n sfo r

mations and the deletion transformation were recognized a s ig n if ic a n t
proportion of the time, while token and object exchange transforma
tions were poorly detected and were within the range of chance.

Fin

a ll y , the effects of transformation type and like lihoo d of occurrence
were apparently independent.
Granting Friedman's assumption that there is a correspondence
between fix a tio n duration and rate of encoding, the finding that the
duration of the f i r s t fixa tion was a function of the a p rio ri l i k e l i 
hood that the fixated object would be present in that p a rtic u la r scene
is strong support for the hypothesis that obligatory, nonobligatory,
and unexpected objects may be d ifferentiated according to the degree
of bottom-up processing evoked.

As predicted, subjects rare ly noticed

changes to expected objects but almost always noted transformations to
unexpected ones.

This would indicate that the frame or schematic

representation of the scene, including any important va ria tio n s on
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it s theme, was the basis for the subjects' recognition responses.
Friedman asserted that providing the subject with knowledge of the gen
eral context of what would be viewed via a verbal prompt allowed the
thus invoked frame structure to aid in the detection of expected ob
jects and resulted in shorter processing times for these objects.

Not

ing that unexpected objects are more d i f f i c u l t to comprehend ( i . e . ,
harder and more time consuming to encode perceptually) but easier to
remember because of the ir differentiated representation, she concluded
that the recognition of a pictured object involves the process of re
membering typical or prototypical instances, afforded by the in sta n tia 
tion of a frame fo r the scene in which the object is embedded, and
that confusions occur (re su ltin g in poor recognition performance) when
the task employs d istra c to rs that correspond to that frame's default
information.
The research reviewed in this section provide clear evidence
that contextual information is in flu e n tia l in the processes of perceiv
ing and responding to p ic to ria l information.

Further, these studies

demonstrate, in accordance with the duplex theory of picture percep
tion, that the effects of this information are most pronounced when
the picture is viewed for a r e la t iv e ly b rie f period.

With prolonged

viewing, the increase in detail or sp e c ific object information makes
i t probable that the nodes or arguments of the scene's schematic
representation w ill become occupied by current input, with the result
that any recognition judgment made at this time w ill be based upon
actual rather than default information.

A helpful d is t in c t io n in

understanding the role of contextual information in picture perception
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is that offered by Friedman (in press) between context as p re -e xisting
knowledge structures and context as a set of environmental constraints
present in the stimulus picture.

The current investigation pursues this

d ist in c t io n , and the resultant e ffe cts, further.
Overview and Statement of the Problem
For the purpose of the present in v e stiga tio n , i t is argued that
the tenets of the duplex theory of picture processing, as proposed by
Biedernan and supplemented and amended by subsequent theory and in v e s t i
gation, are e s s e n t ia lly correct.

An individual possesses a set of

stored knowledge structures, termed schemata or frames, which contain
prototypical information about a given object or scene based on past
experience.

The arguments of object frames represent attribute in f o r 

mation, and th e ir p a rtic u la r structural arrangement captures the unique
relations among attrib ute s that c o lle c tiv e ly combine to re su lt in the
identity of that object.

Object frames are themselves arguments of

more global scene frames, and the network composed by th e ir given
architecture is synonymous with the ide ntity of the given scene.
T yp ica lly, when an individual observes a p a rtic u la r scene these
a p rio r i structures are at work before the i n i t i a l input is received.
This occurs because the current position of the observer in the visual
world is known to him or her, and this knowledge activates a related
set of scene frames and th e ir corresponding expectations.

This set

of a p rio ri schemata or frames i s what is meant by internal context.
As information is extracted from the physical surround of the object
array via peripheral systems, it s processing enriches and completes
the schema for that scene. The extraction and processing of sp e c ific
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information concerning objects from the fovea! system also functions to
enhance these global structures, but prim arily by the direct enhance
ment of object frames.

Thus, an observer enters a situ a tio n with a

schema activated via knowledge of the visual world, and extracts con
textual information from the environment to further d iffe re n tia te a par
t ic u la r scene.

The contextual information extracted from the physical

environment of the object array may be referred to as external context.
The schema for the scene serves to guide the extraction and interpreta
tion of sp e c ific information gathered from the object array of the scene.
Because both internal and external sources of contextual informa
tion function to activate scene frames, i t seems a reasonable assump
tion that th e ir effects are additive.

That is , when a scene's frame

is activated p rio r to viewing the scene and is then embellished via in 
formation from the environmental context of the scene, subsequent ob
ject information should be extracted and processed more e f ic ie n t ly and
accurately than when either one source of contextual information i s
present in iso la t io n .

Recognition of objects interpreted from th is dual

contextual base should be best under conditions where the a lternative
choices for recognition are objects which are arguments for d is s im ila r
scene frames.

When alte rna tive s are arguments of the same scene as the

target, enhancement of the recognition process should s t i l l occur,
but in le sse r degree, as the subject must spend less time processing
the meaningful nature of the global scene, and therefore may more f u ll y
and rapidly process information about the p a rtic u la r arguments of the
scene.

The effects of the jo in t operation of both context sources

should be least pronounced when alternatives in a recogntion test
represent va ria tio n s in attribute frame arguments.
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The current study investigated the rela tionship between internal
and external contexts as they interact with the type of information en
coded from real world pictures.

Subjects were shown line drawings of

arrays of objects for 15Q msec.

These objects were presented either

without background context or embedded in the context of a scene appro
priate to those objects.

Immediately p rior to viewing the objects, sub

jects were v is u a l l y exposed to the words "NO PHRASE HERE" (representing
the no internal context condition), a two or three word label corres
ponding to the topic or meaning of the scene (representing the appropri
ate internal context condition), or to a label inappropriate to the
topic of that scene (representing the inappropriate internal context
condition).

Thus, scene frames were activated p rior to the stimulus

presentation in two conditions, but in one that frame was inappropriate
to the scene presented.

A four alternative forced-choice recognition

test was administered a fte r each stimulus was presented.

The three

d istra c to r items for a given set of stimulus objects were d is s im ila r to
the target objects in either scene, object, or attribute information.
A basic assumption of this study, and one supported by previous re
search (e.g., Loftus & Mackworth 1978), i s that the u t iliz a t io n of
contextual information in the recognition of objects is automatic, and
not under subject control.
I t was hypothesized that subjects would be most accurate in the
object recognition task when both internal and external sources of
contextual information were available, providing that information was
appropriate to the scene from which the objects would t y p ic a lly come.
When one type of contextual information was not available, i t was
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expected that subjects would perform less well, and when available con
textual information was either c o n flic tin g or inappropriate, i t was
expected that subjects would perform at chance levels only.

Regarding

the types of information varied in the response alternatives and their
effects given the proposed contextual manipulations, i t was hypothesized
that variations in scene and object information would show the greatest
e ffe cts, and that the manipulation of attribute information would be in
dependent of contextual manipulations.

CHAPTER I I
METHODOLOGY
Design
The problem under inve stigation required that three variables re
ceive attention:

the physical context within which stimulus objects

were presented, the type of information varied in the d ist ra c to r a l 
ternatives, and the existence and com patibility (re la tiv e to the physi
cal context) of a pre-stimulus prompt.
present or absent.

Physical context was either

The alte rnative s from which the target object was

selected differed from the target object along one of three dimensions:
(a) alte rnative s were objects from d is s im ila r scenes, (b) alternatives
were d iffe re n t objects but from s im ila r scenes, and (c) a lternatives
were the same objects but d if fe r in g in some physical a ttrib ute.
text and type of information varied in

Con

the d istra c to r alte rna tive s

were held constant across t r i a l s for each subject and varied between
subjects.

The pre-stimulus prompt was either compatible or incompatible

with the context surrounding the stimulus object or, in a third con
d itio n , absent.

Prompting conditions were varied across the t r i a l s

given each subject in the experiment, i. e . , prompting was treated as
a w ithin-subjects variable.

Thus, the study employed a 2 X 3 X 3

fa ctoria l design with repeated measures on the third factor such that
s i x independent groups were necessary.

Accuracy of object recognition

judgments in a four alternative forced-choice recognition test and
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confidence ratings corresponding to those judgments were used as measures
of the effects of variable manipulations.
Subjects
The subjects were 72 (21 male) U niversity of North Dakota college
students p a rtic ip a tin g in the experiment for credit in an undergraduate
psychology course.

P articip ation was limited to those ind ivid ua ls re

porting normal v isio n without glasses or whose v isio n was corrected by
contact lenses.

Twelve subjects were randomly assigned to each of the

s i x groups resu ltin g from the fa ctoria l combination of the two context
conditions and the three d istra c to r conditions.
Stimuli
Pi ctures
The 36 pictures used as stim uli were pen and ink lin e drawings
made by a local a r t i s t and depicted both indoor (24 pictures) and out
door (12 pictures) s t i l l - l i f e scenes.

The a r t i s t constructed the

scenes to represent 36 unique and varied themes provided by the ex
perimenter.

Care was taken to avoid the presence of animals or people,

and shadowing was minimized so that the value ( i . e . , re la tiv e l i g h t 
ness or darkness) of objects was roughly equivalent.

Pictured objects

were typical ( i . e . , not unexpected— see Friedman, in press) of the
scene in which they were embedded as determined j o in t ly by the a r t i s t
and the experimenter.

The no-context pictures were generated by se

lecting s ix objects from each scene which represented a wide sp atial
d istribution,reproducing them in the same locations as in the context
pictures, and elim inating a ll other information.

The re su ltin g arrays
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of objects, and the context pictures, were then mounted for tachistoscopic presentation.

Figures 1 and 2 i l l u s t r a t e a stimulus presented

under the two context conditions.

When projected, a ll pictures sub

tended a visual angle of 20 degrees h orizonta lly and v e rt ic a lly .

The

objects ranged in size from 3 to 5 degrees of visual angle.
The pictures were each divided into four equal-sized quadrants
and, for the 36 pictures, each of the four quadrants was randomly samp
led nine times to provide the 36 target objects used in the recognition
test.

When more than one object was located in the sampled quadrant

(th is happened in only three instances) a f l i p of a coin determined
which object would be targeted from that quadrant and for that picture.
Prompts
Two one to three word phrases were generated as descriptors of
each stimulus picture, one compatible with the context of the scene and
one incompatible.

For the set of compatible phrases, a group of 24

undergraduate volunteers drawn from the same pool as the subjects used
in the study proper were asked to give three one to three word phrases
which they f e l t accurately summarized or described each of the 36
scenes.

The most frequent descriptor from the ir responses was adopted

as the compatible prompt for each picture.

The incompatible prompt for

each scene was generated by taking the less frequent responses from
these subjects and p airing them with a picture expressing un unrelated
theme.

When the no-prompt condition was in effect, the words "NO

PHRASE HERE" preceded the stimulus picture.

The three types of phrases

for each picture were typed in uppercase le tte rs and centered on
separate sheets of 22 X 28 cm paper for presentation.
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Fig. 1. Example of targeted object (toaster in lower le ft'
hand corner) presented under the context-present condition.
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Fig. 2. Example of targeted object (toaster in lower le f t hand corner) presented under the context-absent condition.
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Written prompts were chosen rather than p ic to ria l ones for two
reasons.

The purpose of the prompt was to activate in the subject a

mental h o l i s t i c representation of the scene described by that prompt.
And while both written and p ic to ria l prompts are comparable in provid
ing h o l i s t i c or semantic information about pictures under b r ie f ex
posure conditions (see Potter 1975), the additional sp e c ific or detailed
information availab le in a p ic to ria l format might give r ise to a more
embellished representation than desired in the present study.

The

second reason was a purely economic one; written prompts are le ss ex
pensive and time consuming to produce than p ic to ria l ones.
Each subject was presented with 12 pictures preceded by compatible
prompts, 12 preceded by incompatible prompts, and 12 preceded by the
phrase "NO PHRASE HERE."

To control for the effect of prompt presenta

tion order, 12 different prompt orders were randomly generated with the
r e s t ric t io n that no one type of prompt could precede more than three
pictures in a row.

Thus, the 12 subjects in each independent group

each received a different prompt order, with the f i r s t subject in one
group receiving the same order as the f i r s t subject in the other five
groups, etc.

In addition, the pairing of prompt types and pictures

was counterbalanced, such that each picture was viewed preceded by each
of the three types of prompts by four of the 12 subjects within each
of the s i x independent groups created by the fa ctoria l combination of
the two context conditions and the three d istra c to r conditions.
Response Alternatives
The 108 response alternatives were pen and ink representations
of objects drawn by the same a r t i s t who constructed the stim uli.
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A lternatives varying in scene information were drawn such that they
were approximately the same true size as the targeted objects but from
vastly d ifferent contexts (see Figure 3).

Alternatives varying in ob

ject information were different from the target object but from sim i
la r scenes (see Figure 4).

The alternatives which were varied in the

attribute information they contained were objects possessing the same
general meaning but d ifferent along some physical dimension (see Figure
5).

The objects selected as transformations of object and attribute

information also approximated th e ir respective target objects in true

size.
For a given response alternative condition, the target object
and three d istra c to rs were drawn in the four c e lls created by a 2 X 2
matrix.

Each quadrant was 10 X 10 cm and the target objects were the

same size in both the picture and response matrix presentations.
Across the 36 pictures, each quadrant in the response matrix was oc
cupied by a target object equally often.

The four objects for each

of the three response alternative conditions corresponding to each of
the 36 pictures were drawn on separate sheets of 22 X 28 cm paper fo r
presentati on.
Procedure
P rio r to the a rriv a l of a subject, the experimenter determined
the appropriate prompt presentation order and d istra c to r condition and
made up a looseleaf notebook that alternated prompts and response a l 
ternatives for a ll 36 pictures.

Thus, the f i r s t page in this notebook

contained the prompt for the f i r s t picture (the type determined by
the presentation order in e ffe c t), followed by the response matrix
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Fig. 3. Example of the response matrix employed in the forcedchoice object recognition test under the scene-distractor condition.
This p a rtic u la r matrix corresponds to the stimulus presented in
Figures 1 and 2, where the toaster in the upper right-hand cell
represents the targeted object and the correct choice.

71

Fig. 4. Example of the response matrix employed in the forcedchoice object recognition test under the ob je c t-d istra c tor condition.
This p a rtic u la r matrix corresponds to the stimulus presented in
Figures 1 and 2, where the toaster in the upper right-hand cell repre
sents the targeted object and the correct choice.
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Fig. 5. Example of the response matrix employed in the forcedchoice object recognition test under the a ttr ib u te -d ist ra c to r condi
tion. This p a rtic u la r matrix corresponds to the stimulus presented in
Figures 1 and 2, where the toaster in the upper right-hand c e ll repre
sents the targeted object and the correct choice.
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for the f i r s t picture on the second page (determined by the d istra c to r
condition in e ffe c t), followed by the third page containing the prompt
corresponding to the second stimulus picture, etc.
run in d iv id u a lly .

The subjects were

Upon a r r iv a l , subjects were seated at a table con

tainin g the notebook and a prepared answer sheet on which to record
th e ir recognition judgments.

Also located on the table was a two-

channel Gerbrands Harvard tachistoscope.

P rio r to the f i r s t t r i a l , sub

jects were read a prepared set of in structions (see Appendix A) which
informed them that the study was concerned with the perception of
b r ie f l y presented pictures and instructed them in the procedure o f the
experimental task.

Further, they were told that three types of phrases

were possible for any given picture, and that over the course of view
ing a ll 36 pictures the three types would occur equally often.
were simply told to "attend" to the phrases in any case.

They

Subjects

in it ia t e d a t r i a l by turning the page in the looseleaf notebook and
s i l e n t l y reading the prompt for the upcoming stimulus.

They then im

mediately looked into the tachistoscope and, as previously instructed,
fixated an "X " c e ntrally located on the screen where the picture was
shown.

Having indicated that they had done th is by saying "READY,"

the stimulus picture was exposed for 150 msec.

When the picture d is 

appeared subjects looked back to the notebook where the matrix con
taining the target object and three a lternatives was then v i s ib l e (the
experimenter turned the page in the notebook while the subject viewed
the stimulus picture).

When the decision was made as to which of the

four objects in the matrix they had seen in the picture, subjects
recorded that decision on the answer sheet (see Appendix B).

In ad

d itio n , subjects were asked to assign a confidence rating to their
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judgments.

The ratings were made on a scale anchored at five points

from "0 " (representing not at a ll certain) through "4" (representing
extremely ce rtain), and were recorded on the prepared answer sheet.
Turning the page with the response matrix for the picture ju st viewed
exposed the prompt corresponding to the next picture and served as
the beginning of the next t r i a l .
by 30 experimental t r i a l s .

Six practice t r i a l s were succeeded

The entire procedure, including task in stru c 

tions and debriefing, required approximately 45 minutes.

The luminances

of the pre- and post-exposure fie ld s were equated and approximated
that of the experimental room.

A ll t r i a l s were conducted in the same

7 X 12 ft room free of noise and occupied only by the equipment neces
sary for the experiment.
Data A nalysis
Each subject yielded 36 responses on both the recognition accur
acy and confidence measures.
were included in the analyses.

Only data from the 30 experimental t r i a l s
Both accuracy and confidence measures

were summed within the prompting conditions to obtain three totals for
both measures for each subject, and these were summed across subjects
within the same context X d istra c to r condition to y ie ld 18 sets of
totals for both measures.
Data for recognition accuracy were subjected to a three factor
a n a ly sis of variance with one repeated factor as an omnibus test for
sig n ific a n c e .

A fixed model was assumed.

Internal comparisons computed

on prompting condition and d ist ra c to r a lternatives were accomplished
using the Newman-Keuls procedure outlined in Winer (1971).
Confidence ratings for the 18 data sets generated by the fa c t o r i
al combination of the three variables were also subjected to an a n alysis
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of variance (fixed model); internal comparisons being computed with
the Newman-Keuls procedure.

While these data do not s t r i c t l y conform

to the sc a la r c h a ra c te ristic s assumed in the employment of the analyss i s of variance, Tukey (1962) has em pirically demonstrated that the
rela tionship between the assignment of numbers to ordered classes and
the unknown, ideal assignment along an interval or ratio scale i s sub
sta n tia l (between .60 and .98).

Thus, the u t i l i z a t i o n of the more ef

f ic ie n t and powerful (compared to non-parametric a lte rna tive s) analy
s i s of variance and parametric post hoc comparison techniques appears
j u s t if ie d .

CHAPTER I I I

RESULTS
Recognition Accuracy
The means and standard deviations for the accuracy measure are
presented in Table 1 for each of the Context-Distractor-Prompt condi
tions.

I t can be seen that the mean number of correct recognition

judgments ranged from 3.583 when the target objects were viewed within
the context of a scene (context-present condition), the d istra c to rs in
the recognition test were conceptually equivalent to the target object
but varied along some physical dimension (a t trib u te -d istra c to r condi
tio n ), and the pre-stimulus prompt was compatible with the context of
the scene in which the target object was viewed or the scene in which
i t i s ty p ic a lly found (compatible-prompt condition), to 8.333 under
the same context and prompt conditions but where response a lternatives
were objects from a scene d is s im ila r to that in which the target was
presented or in which i t is t y p ic a lly found (scene-distractor condi
tion).

This may be compared to a possible range for any condition of

from 0.0 to 10.0, where a mean accuracy score of 2.5 would correspond
to chance-level responding.

Also presented in Table 1 are the means

for each condition of the three major variables, collap sin g across the
conditions of the other two variables.
These accuracy scores were i n i t i a l l y analyzed using a three-way
A nalysis of Variance applied to the Context by D istractor by Prompt
fa ctoria l combination.

The re su lts of th is a nalysis are summarized in
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T a b le 1

Means and Standard Deviations:
Number of Correct Recognition Responses
Di strac tor
Scene

Object

Attribute

Compatible

8.333
(1.303)

5.167
(1.528)

3.583
(1.311)

Neutral

6.833
(1.528)

4.667
(1.969)

3.667
(1.155)

Incompatible

6.917
(1.832)

5.000
(1.206)

3.833
(1.193)

Compatible

8.167
(2.038)

5.417
(1.782)

4.417
(1.782)

Neutral

6.750
(1.288)

5.417
(1.564)

4.333
(1.614)

5. 500
(2.067)

4.583
(1.443)

4.667
(1.303)

7.083*

5.042

4.083

Prompt

Present

Context

Prompt
5. 847**
5.278

5.333
5.083

Context

Absent

Incompatible

D istractor

5.472

*Mean d iffe rs s ig n if ic a n t ly from the lowest mean (p < .01) and the next lower mean (p < .05)
**Mean d iffe rs s ig n if ic a n t ly (p < .01) from the two lower means

78

Table 2.

Both the type of d istra c to r objects employed in the object

recognition test and the compatabi1ity (re la tive to the physical con
text in which the target object was embedded or in which i t is usually
found) of the prompt preceding the stimulus presentation were s t a t i s 
t i c a l l y s ig n if ic a n t sources of variation.

In addition, the interaction

of these two variables was sig n ific a n t.
Using the Newman-Keuls procedure for comparing the differences
between means, i t was determined that target objects were recognized
s i g n if ic a n t l y more often when the scene-distractor condition was in
effect than when d istra c to r objects were conceptually d ifferent objects
from sim ila r scenes (ob je ct-d istra ctor condition) or when the a ttrib uted istra c to r condition was administered (see Table 1 for sig n ific a n c e
le v e ls ).

Recognition accuracy under these la tte r two conditions did not

d if f e r s ig n if ic a n t ly .

Regarding the differences in accuracy for the

various prompting conditions, the compatible-prompt condition resulted
in s ig n i f i c a n t l y better performance than either the neutral-prompt ( i. e . ,
the absence of a meaningful scene description) or the incompatibleprompt ( i. e . , a pre-stimulus phrase which gave an inaccurate or mislead
ing description of the stimulus scene or of the scene in which the target
object would most probably be found) conditions (see Table 1 for prob
a b ilitie s).

The observed differences between the neutral and incom

patible prompting conditions fa ile d to reach s t a t i s t i c a l significa nce .
Subsequent analysis of the D istra ctor by Prompt interaction using
a test for simple effects (see Kirk, 1968) revealed that prompting man
ipulations had a s ig n if ic a n t effect only when the response alternatives
in the test were objects from d is s im ila r scenes (p. < .01).

The observed

su p e rio rity of accuracy performance under the scene d ist ra c to r condition
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Table 2
Context by D istra ctor by Prompt ANOVA Summary:
Number of Correct Recognition Responses

Source

df

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

F

Context (C)

1

1.04

1.04

D istra ctor (D)

2

338.08

168.04

C X D

2

16.08

8.04

2.20

66

241.42

3.66

-

Prompt (P)

2

22.69

11.35

C X P

2

6.19

3.10

1.63

D X P

4

34.39

8.60

4.52**

C X D X P

4

4.72

1.18

.62

Error (within)

132

251.33

1.90

-

Total

215

915.95

Error (between)

**p < .01
* **p < .001

.28
46.21***

5.96** *
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was s ig n if ic a n t , regardless of the p a rtic u la r prompting condition em
ployed (p < .01).

The interactive nature of these two variables is repre

sented p ic t o r i a l l y in Figure 6.

As shown in that figu re , providing sub

jects with an accurate description of the scene portrayed in the stimulus
picture increased accuracy in the object recognition test, but only when
the response a lternatives in that test were objects from d is s im ila r
scenes.

When a lternatives were the same object conceptually as the ta r

get but different in physical appearance or when they were conceptually
d iffe re n t objects but from s im ila r scenes, performance was not altered
s ig n if ic a n t ly .

Figure 6 also i l l u s t r a t e s the finding that scene d istra c -

tors resulted in superior performance within each of the three prompting
conditions, when compared to object or a ttribute d istra c to rs.
An unexpected finding was the f a ilu re to observe a s ig n if ic a n t i n 
teraction between the Context and D istra ctor factors (see Table 2).
Previous research (e.g., Antes & Metzger, in press) has established that
the presence or absence of scene context interacts with the type of d is 
tractor objects employed in subsequent recognition tests in affecting a
su b je c t's a b i l i t y to accurately recognize objects.

Antes and Metzger

(in press) found that objects viewed within the context of a scene were
better recognized when the response alternatives in the recognition test
were objects from d is s im ila r scenes, whereas no differences in recogni
tion performance were found when context-present versus context-absent
conditions were compared when the response alternatives were objects
that were conceptually different but from the same or sim ila r scenes
(e.g., a toaster served as an alternative to a targeted blender).

As a

consequence of the fa ilu re to discover this expected interaction between

Prompt Type:

9

CCCC - Compatible
8

7
6

5
4
3
2
1
0

CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC

NNNN - Neutral
I I I I - Incompatible
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
Scene

IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII

CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC

NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
Object

IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII

CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC
CCCC

NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN
NNNN

IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII
IIII

Attribute

Di stractor
6. Mean number of correct recognition responses for the conditions re su ltin g from the
bination of D istractor and Prompt variables.
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Context and D istractor, additional analyses were performed in an attempt
to understand this discrepancy.
An examination of the means (Table 1) for the scene and a ttribute
d istra c to r conditions together with those from the context-present and
context-absent conditions reveals an apparent pattern.

When d istra c to rs

were from d is s im ila r scenes accuracy of recognition judgments was superior
in the context-present condition, but when d istra c to rs were objects con
ceptually identical but with some physical attrib ute altered the su p e ri
o r it y in accuracy was in favor of the context-absent condition.

D if f e r 

ences between the two context conditions appeared nil under the objectd istra c to r condition.

Such an

in te rre la tio n sh ip between Context and

D istractor may not have been revealed in the o rig in a l a nalysis which
included a ll three conditions of the D istra c to r factor, so a second
A nalysis of Variance was performed with the o b je c t-d istra c tor condition
omi tted.
This a n a ly sis, summarized in Appendix C, resulted in the expected
s ig n if ic a n t interaction between Context and D istra c to r (p < .05).

A

subsequent a n a ly sis of the simple effects showed that accuracy perfor
mance was best when d istra c to rs were from d is s im ila r scenes, regardless
of the context condition (p <

.01).

The su p e rio rity in accuracy under

the context-present versus context-absent conditions was near (.05< p< .10)
but fa ile d to reach sig n ific a n c e when d istra c to r objects were from d i s 
s im ila r scenes.

Context-absent performance was better than context-

present performance, but again not s i g n if ic a n t l y (.05<
the a ttrib u te -d ist ra c to r condition was in effect.

p < .10), when

Thus, while sig n ific a n c e

was not attained, a trend in the expected direction was c le a rly evidenced.
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A more exact replication of p rior researches into the combined
effects of scene context and the type of d ist ra c to r objects used in the
recognition task (e.g., Antes & Metzger, in press) was the fa c to ria l
combination of the two context conditions with the scene-distractor
and ob je c t-d istra c tor conditions employed in the present study.

An

A nalysis of Variance performed on this combination and reported in Appen
dix C revealed that the Context by D istra ctor interaction approached,
but again did not reach s ig n if ic a n t levels.
A final a nalysis undertaken on the accuracy measures examined the
fa ilu r e to achieve a s ig n if ic a n t Prompt by Context interaction (see
Table 2).

Such an interaction had been predicted p rio r to data c o lle c 

tion, and an inspection of the means presented in Table 1 for the v a r i 
ous conditions involved reveals that context-absent performance was
better when stim uli were preceded by compatible prompts, whereas under
the context-present condition there were apparently no substantial
differences in accuracy between the compatible-prompt and incompatibleprompt conditions.

For this final analysis then, the neutral-prompt

condition was excluded and the remaining two prompt conditions were
f a c t o r ia lly combined with the two context conditions and subjected to
an A nalysis of Variance.

Results from th is a n a ly sis, summarized in

Appendix C, were consistent with those obtained from the i n i t i a l analy
s i s in showing a non -sign ific a n t interaction between Context and
Prompt.

The effects of these two variables upon recognition accuracy

were apparently independent, with compatible prompts re su ltin g in
superior accuracy when compared to neutral or incompatible prompts
regardless of the presence or absence of a physical context when pre
senting the target objects.

84

Confidence Ratings
Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations for the con
fidence ratings assigned by subjects to their recognition judgments.
The possible range was from 0.0 (complete lack of confidence) to 4.0
(extreme c e rtainty), and the obtained range for the mean confidence
ratings was from 1.075 in the context-present, a t t r ib u t e - d is t r a c t o r ,
incompatible-prompt condition, to 2.175 in the context-present, scene
d istra c to r, compatible-prompt condition.
These confidence ratings were analyzed using a three-way A nalysis
of Variance applied to the Context by D istractor by Prompt combination.
The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 4.

Consistent with

the accuracy scores, the type of d istra c to r employed in the object
recognition te st and the type of prompt presented p rio r to the stimulus
s ig n i f i c a n t l y affected subjects' confidence ratings.

Unlike accuracy,

these ratings were not d if f e r e n t ia lly affected by an interaction of
D istractor and Prompt, suggesting the independence of the two in the ir
effects upon a su b je c t's assessment of his or her success at detecting
the target object.
Using the Newman-Keuls procedure for comparing means, i t was
found that subjects were more confident in the ir recognition judgments

under the scene-distractor and o b je c t-d istra c tor conditions than under
the a ttrib u te -d ist ra c to r condition (p < .01).

Subjects were thus

least confident when the d istra c to r objects were conceptually id e n t i
cal to the target object but varied in physical appearance.

No

s t a t i s t i c a l l y s ig n if ic a n t difference was found when scene and object
d istra c to rs were compared with each other, though subjects were

Table 3

Means and Standard Deviations:
Confidence Ratings
Di stractor
Scene

Object

Attribute

Compatible

2.175
( .928)

1.833
( .549)

1.225
( -742)

Neutral

1.917
( .861)

1.942
( .540)

1.142
( .576)

Incompatible

2.067
( .617)

1.700
( .598)

1.075
( .705)

C
w ou im| -n' ua

1.942
( .530)

1.825
( .515)

1.475
( .533)

1.800
( .433)

1.717
( .730)

1.292
( .552)

1.633
( .854)

1.733
( .576)

1.283
( -691)

1.922*

1.792*

1.249

Prompt

Present

Prompt

Context

1 .745**

1.675

—

1.582

Context

Absent

to ii h
1 o
v j i v.

Neutral
Incompatible

D istractor

1.635

1.622

*Mean d iffe rs s ig n i f i c a n t l y (p '< .01) from the lowest mean
**Mean d iffe rs s ig n if ic a n t l y from the lowest mean (p < .01) and the next lower mean (p < .05)
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Table 4
Context by D istractor by Prompt ANOVA Summary:
Confidence Ratings

Source

df

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

F

Context (C)

1

.12

.12

D istra c to r (D)

2

18.54

9.27

C X D

2

1.97

.99

1 .03

66

63.37

.96

-

Prompt (P)

2

1.12

.56

3.45*

C X P

2

.03

.02

.09

D X P

4

.19

.05

.29

C X D X P

4

.51

.13

.79

Error (within)

132

21.43

.16

-

Total

215

107.29

Error (between)

*p < .05
***p

< .001

.13
9 .6 6 ***
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somewhat more confident in their responses when d istra c to rs were varied
in scene information (see Table 3).
Regarding prompt effects, subjects were s i g n if ic a n t l y more con
fident in their recognition responses when stimuli were preceded by
compatible scene descriptions than when preceded by either neutral
(p < .05) or incompatible (p < .01) descriptors.

Subject confidence

did not vary s ig n i f i c a n t l y as a function of whether stim uli were pre
ceded by neutral or incompatible prompts.
Weighted Confidence Scores
In addition to accuracy and confidence scores, a third measure
was created to function as an estimate of subjects' a b i l i t y to appropri
ately place th e ir confidence.

To create such a measure, confidence

ratings were signed or weighted according to whether or not the recog
nition response given by the subject had been accurate or inaccurate
(see Palmer 1975b).

Thus, a subject who gave a confidence rating of

(2) to a correct recognition judgment would receive a weighted con
fidence score of (+2), while a subject that assigned a confidence r a t 
ing of (2) to an incorrect recognition judgment received a weighted
confidence score of (-2) for that stimulus.

When subjects indicated

that they were not at a ll confident in the selection that they had
made ( i . e . , assigned a confidence rating of (0) to their recognition
judgment), then they received a weighted confidence score of (0) re
gardless of whether th e ir recognition response was accurate or in 
accurate.
Tabl e 5 presents the means and standard deviations for these
weighted confidence scores for each of the Context-Distractor-Prompt

Table 5

Means and Standard Deviations:
Weighted Confidence Scores
Di strac tor

Present

Prompt

Scene

Object

Attribute

Compatible

1.975
( .952)

.392
( .765)

-.092
( .464)

Neutral

1.433
( .873)

.308
( .918)

-.008
( .392)

Incompatible

1.367
( .934)

.533
( .505)

0.000
( .407)

Compatible

1.558
( .850)

.750
( -713)

.292
( .775)

Neutral

1.233
( .818)

.600
( .441)

.158
( -691)

Incompatible

.925
( .689)

.533
( .576)

.367
( .440)

Context

.812 *
.621
.656
.621

Context

Absent

Di stractor
★

1.415**

.519*

.119

Mean d iffe rs s ig n if ic a n t ly (p < .01) from the next lower mean

**Mean d iffe rs s i g n if ic a n t l y (p < .01) from the two lower means

Prompt

.713
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combinations.

Here the possible range of mean score values is from

-4.0 (inappropriately placing extreme confidence in incorrect recogni
tion responses) to +4.0 (appropriately placing extreme confidence in
correct retognition responses), with the value of chance or random
responding undetermined.

The observed range, as indicated in Table 5,

was from -.092 for the context-present, a ttrib u te -d istra c to r, com
patible-prompt condition, to 1.975 for the same context and prompt
conditions but where response alternatives were from d is s im ila r scenes.
These weighted confidence scores, representing a synthesis of the
accuracy and confidence measures, were i n i t i a l l y analyzed with a
three-way A nalysis of Variance applied to the Context by D istractor
by Prompt fa ctoria l combination.
presented in Table 6.

The results of this a n alysis are

The effect of varying the type of d istra c to rs

in the recognition test s ig n i f i c a n t l y affected scores on th is measure,
as did the combination of Context and D istra c to r variables.

The com

parison of mean weighted confidence scores for the three types of
d istra c to rs showed that subjects were more capable of accurately judg
ing the ir performance when the test d istra c to rs were objects from d i s 
s im ila r scenes than when they were either d ifferent objects from
sim ila r scenes (p < .01) or the same objects whose physical attributes
were varied (p < .01).

Furthermore, d iffe re n t objects from sim ila r

scenes resulted in a greater accuracy in confidence assignments than
did the condition where objects in the recognition test differed in
attrib ute information (p < .01).
The Context by D istra ctor interaction effects upon th is weighted
confidencd score are depicted in Figure 7.

A subsequent a nalysis of
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Table 6
Context by D istra c to r by Prompt ANOVA Summary
Weighted Confidence Scores

Source

df

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

F

Context (C'

1

.17

.17

D istractor (D)

2

63.40

31.70

43.41***

C X D

2

4.59

2.30

3.14*

66

48.19

.73

-

Prompt (P)

2

1.76

.88

2.33

C X P

2

.18

.09

.24

D X P

4

3.43

.86

2.26

C X D X P

4

.64

.16

.42

Error (wi thiin)

132

49.99

Total

215

172.36

Error (betn/een)

*p < .05
* * * p < .00

.24

D istra c to r Type:

1.750

SSSS - Scene
1.500
1.250
1.000
Mean
Weighted

.750

Confi dence
.500
.250
0

SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS

SSSS

SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
cccc

JJJJ

-.250

0000 - Object

SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS

0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000

AAAA
AAAA
AAAA
AAAA
AAAA
AAAA

Present

AAAA

0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000
nnnn
ww ww
0000
0000
0000
0000
0000

- Attribute

AAAA
AAAA
AAAA
AAAA
AAAA
AAAA
AAAA
AAAA
AAAA
AAAA

Absent
Context

Figure 7. Mean weighted confidence scores for the conditions re su ltin g from the fa ctoria l
combination of Context and D istractor variables.
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simple effects indicated that v a riations in this measure approached but
did not reach s t a t i s t i c a l l y s ig n if ic a n t levels (.05 < p < .10) when
context-present and context-absent conditions were compared for the
situ a tio n where the response alternatives were from d is s im ila r scenes.
There was a trend in the data ind icating that scores were higher under
context-present than context-absent condition when d istra c to rs were
from d is s im ila r scenes.

When the two context conditions were contrasted

within the ob je c t-d istra c tor and a ttrib u te -d istra c to r conditions the
observed variations in weighted confidence scores did not even approach
s ig n ific a n t levels.

I t can be seen in Figure 7 that the manipulation

of recognition test d istra c to r objects resulted in s ig n if ic a n t (p < .01)
differences when compared at both levels of the Context variable, with
scene d istra c to r conditions re su ltin g in higher weighted confidence
scores than either of the other two d istra c to r conditions.

The d i f f e r 

ences between object and a ttribute d istra c to r conditions were not s i g 
n ific a n t under either context conditions.
Accuracy, Confidence Ratings, and Weighted Confidence
Scores Summarized
The major results from th is investigation indicate that the type
of response a lternatives or d istra c to rs employed in the object recogni
tion test, and the compatabi1it y of the pre-stimulus prompt (re la tive
to the context in which the target object was viewed or the context of
the scene in which i t is t y p ic a lly found) su b sta n tia lly influenced both
sub jects' accuracy in the recognition test and the ir confidence in
the ir selections.

Response a lternatives from d is s im ila r scenes con

s is t e n t ly resulted in better recognition performance and greater con
fidence than when the test required that target objects be selected
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from among a lternatives from sim ila r scenes but conceptually different
or alterna tives that were conceptually identical but varied along some
physi cal diimension.

Subject confidence was a more se n sitiv e measure of

th is varia tion, as ratings were s ig n i f i c a n t l y smaller ( i . e . , subjects
were less confident) when d istra c to rs were attrib ute rather than object
d istra c to r s.

The synthesized weighted confidence score was the most

se n sitiv e measure of the three, with a ll three d istra c to r types re su lting in sig n if ic a n t ly d ifferent scores when contrasted with each other,
Both the a ccuracy of the recognition judgments and subjects' confidence
were enhan ced when the pre-stimulus prompt was compatible with the
stimulus picture (array).

For neither measure were any differences

sig n i fican t between response given under the neutral and incompatible
prompt con d ition s.

The a b i l i t y of subjects to appropriately place

their confliidence in an object selection was not d if f e r e n t ia lly i n f lu enced by any one of the three prompting conditions,
Subj ect accuracy on the recognition test was also influenced by
the intera ction of the D istra ctor and Prompt variab le s, with greater
accuracy r e su ltin g when compatible prompts preceded stim uli i f the
d istra c to r objects used in the test were from d is s im ila r scenes, but
not when diis tractors were from sim ila r scenes or differed from the
target obj ect so le ly in physical appearance.

Prompt and D istra ctor

factors were independent in the ir effects upon subjects' confidence
ratings an d upon the subjects' accuracy in a ssigning those confidence
rati ngs.
The apparent but n o n -sign ific a n t tendency for Context and Distractor to interact evidenced in the accuracy and confidence scores
reached si gn ifica nt levels using the weighted confidence scores.
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Subsequent analyses revealed that d istra c to r type was a substantial fac
tor at both levels of Context, but that the presence of absence of con
text approached sign ific a n c e only for the scene and a ttribute d istra c to r
conditions.

Looking at the Context by D istractor interaction using

the recognition accuracy measure when the ob je ct-d istra ctor condition
had been excluded also resulted in overall sign ific a n c e , and the pattern
found with the weighted confidence scores using a ll three d istra c to r
conditions was replicated . . . scene d istra c to rs resulted in s i g n i f i 
cantly higher performance (accuracy) compared to attribute d istra c to rs,
regardless of the context condition, and the presence or absence of
context varied su b sta n tia lly but not s i g n if ic a n t l y when contrasted
separately under the scene and attribute d istra c to r conditions.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION
I t might be helpful to begin this discussion by reviewing the
theoretical foundation for this investigation as proposed at the con
clusion of the Introduction.

In keeping with the duplex theory of

picture perception, i t was proposed that one's perception and subse
quent recognition of pictured objects and scenes results from the
acquisition of several sources of information.

One source of informa

tion is the product of a direct foveal inspection of objects within a
scene such that the detail of the inspected objects is determined and
available for further use by the observer.

A second source of in f o r 

mation is derived from the physical context depicted in the scene
( i f any), which functions as a meaningful background for the pictured
objects, and in the present study is referred to as external context.
The third source of information about objects and scenes resides
within the observer in the form of a memorial network, organized on
the basis of past experiences with sim ila r objects and scenes, which
provides information very sim ila r to that gleaned from the scene's
physical context, and in the present study i s referred to as internal
context.

These latte r two sources of information combine to result

in a h o l i s t i c characterization or schema of the scene, containing a
more general than sp e c if ic type of information, and helping to make
95
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possible an e ff ic ie n t and rapid interpretation of pictured objects and
scenes.

The detailed information about pictured objects is eventually

assim ilated into this representation, making i t more complete and
v e rid ic a l.

The present study was designed to allow an assessment of

the separate and combined effects of these three sources of information
as they function to present the observer with a meaningful visual experi
ence of p ic t o r i a l l y represented objects and scenes.
Recognition Accuracy
A review of past research in object and scene perception led
d ire c tly to the formulation of certain hypotheses regarding the re la 
tionship of these informational sources as they might influence accuracy
performance on an object recognition task.

S p e c if ic a lly , i t was ex

pected that subjects would be most accurate on such a task when both
internal and external sources of contextual information were available,
provided that such information was appropriate to the scene from which
the targeted objects would t y p ic a lly come.

When one type of con

textual information was not present, i t was anticipated that subjects
would perform less w ell, and when the available contextual information
was either absent or c o n flic tin g , i t was predicted that subjects would
perform at chance levels on the recognition task.

I t was also hy

pothesized that the type of response alternatives employed in the recog
n itio n task, varied to obtain an indication of the type of information
encoded and available to the observer, would interact with the presence
or absence of the two sources of contextual information.

The expected

form of this interaction was that context manipulations would have
their greatest impact on recognition accuracy when the d istra c to rs
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were objects from d is s im ila r scenes ( i . e . , in the scene-distractor con
d it io n ), or when they were objects from sim ila r scenes but possessing
a different generic name ( i . e . , under the ob je ct-d istra ctor condition).
When the d istra c to r objects were identical in name but different in
appearance ( i . e . , the a ttrib u te -d istra c to r condition) compared to the
target object, i t was anticipated that the manipulations in contextual
information would be ineffectual in producing d iffe re n tia l accuracy rates
in the object recognition task.
The re su lts obtained from this inve stiga tion were predominantly
but not wholly in accord with these a p rio ri expectations.

The v a ria 

tion in the type of d istra c to r objects employed in the recognition test
resulted in s i g n if ic a n t differences in performance regardless of the
presence or absence of contextual information (either internal or ex
ternal).

Further, the type of internal contextual information made

available to the subject seemed to be a s ig n if ic a n t factor in i t s effect
upon recognition accuracy, but only under the condition where the
task employed d istra c to r objects from d is s im ila r scenes; the expected
interaction between d istra c to r type and the type of internal context
availab le was thus evidenced.

Inconsistent with a p rio ri predictions

was the finding that the two sources of contextual information were
apparently independent, with va ria tio n s in internal context s i g n i f i 
cantly affecting performance

in the manner indicated above, while

the presence or absence of a physical context fa ile d to d if f e r e n t ia lly
affect performance on the recognition task.

Also unexpected was the

fa ilu r e to find a s ig n if ic a n t interaction between the presence or
absence of external context and the type of d istra c to r objects employed
in the recognition task.

As noted in the Results, this interaction
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was indeed indicated by the data, but fa ile d to reach s t a t i s t i c a l s i g 
nificance.
In the current study, subjects were e s se n t ia lly confronted with
a discrim ination task . . . accurate recognition responses were re
corded when subjects were able to discriminate between a targeted ob
ject from a previously viewed stimulus and three a lternative objects
not previously viewed.

A pertinent question i s , "How d i f f i c u l t was the

discrim ination required of the subject?"

The results indicated that

subjects were most accurate in se lecting the target object when general
information about the scene from which the objects would ty p ic a lly
come was required ( i . e . , the response alternatives were objects from
scenes d is s im ila r to those in which the target object would usually be
found).

When more sp e c ific information concerning the ide ntity or

appearance of the target object was required, subject accuracy was s i g 
n if ic a n t ly reduced.

This la tte r situ a tio n occurred when d istra c to r

objects in the recognition test were objects from sim ila r scenes but
possessing a d ifferent name than the target, or when the d istra c to rs
had the same generic name but were d iffe re n t in appearance from the ta r
get object.

Em pirically then, discrim ination d if f i c u l t y was greatest

when the form of the recognition task was such that sp e c ific informa
tion about the target object was required, and least when i t required
only general information.

This consistent difference in d if f i c u l t y ,

found across the other two factors (internal and external context) and
regardless of the interaction between the type of d istra c to r employed
and the type of internal context available, is consistent with and
predictable from the duplex theory of picture perception.

As discussed

in the Introduction, that theory postulates that while both general
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and s p e c if ic information about pictured objects and scenes is immediately
available to the observer, the proportion of a ll pote ntially available
general information exceeds the proportion of a ll p ote ntia lly available
sp e c ific information during the f i r s t few seconds of viewing.

There

fore, general information is more in flu e n tia l in it s effects upon a sub
j e c t 's recognition response when that response is based upon information
gathered from very b r ie f stimulus exposures, as in the present study.
The finding that recognition accuracy was superior when internal
contextual information ( i . e . , scene descriptions or prompts) was pro
vided p rior to viewing the stim uli i s complicated by the interaction of
this factor with the form of the recognition task employed with a given
subject ( i. e . , what type of d istra c to r objects were involved).

Sub

jects were most accurate when scene descriptions were compatible with
the scene or array of objects they were to view, less accurate when the
stimulus was preceded by a neutral phrase, and least accurate when
the scene description
i t preceded.

was incompatible with the scene or object array

This pattern of differences was s ig n if ic a n t only under

the te sting condition where the response alternatives used in the recog
n itio n test were objects from d is s im ila r scenes.

Such a re su lt is

highly supportive of the view that scene descriptions presented p rior
to the stim uli were being used prim arily at the time of response ( i . e . ,
when the subject was required to select one object from among four pos
s ib le objects as having been viewed previously).

Under such an in t e r 

pretation, internal contextual information may be u tiliz e d by the
observer to rule-out or ignore objects in the recognition test that
seem inappropriate to the context of the scene in which the target ob
ject was presented (or in which i t is t y p ic a lly found).

Such a response
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strategy, i f employed by subjects in the present study, would lead to
exactly the pattern of differences observed.

Subjects could use the

general information about the scene and objects contained in the verbal
description when the form of the recognition task given the subject
required only general information to make an accurate recognition judg
ment.

Such a response strategy would be of l i t t l e use when the recogni

tion task required sp e c if ic information about the targeted object.

In

the present study the scene descriptions were far too general (e.g.,
"KITCHEN SCENE") to provide the necessary sp e c ific information, and
performance under such test conditions ( i . e . , when sp e c ific information
was required) was indeed not affected d if f e r e n t ia lly by the various
types of prompts or scene descriptions preceding the stimulus presenta
tion.

I t is expected that a sim ila r pattern of findings would re su lt

even i f nci pictures were presented.
The above response interpretation of the interaction between in 
ternal context and d istra c to r type is e n tire ly consistent with the sug
gestion by Antes, Penland, and Metzger (manuscript in preparation) that
contextual information is u t iliz e d both during perception, and at the
time of response. According to Antes, et a l. , available physical context
influences the p rob ab ility that any given pictured object w ill be at
tended and processed perceptually, and influences the course and outcome
of that processing.

Further, at the time of response in a recognition

task, the subject goes through a two-stage decision process:

The sub

ject questions, "Do I remember seeing any of these objects in the scene
(array) that I ju st viewed?"

I f the response is affirm ative, then the

subject selects the object that was recognized.

I f the response is

negative, then a second question is posed, "Which of the objects
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available for selection most probably came from the scene (array) that
I ju st viewed?"
la s t question.

The su b je c t's selection re fle cts the answer to this
The interpretation given the D istractor by Prompt in te r 

action found in the present investigation is obviously consistent with
such a two-stage response process, extended to include the influence of
internal contextual information;

that i s , information availab le p rior

to viewing the scene (array of objects).
I f varying the type ( i . e . , compatability re la tiv e to the scene or
object array serving as the stimulus) of internal context made available
to the subject in the form of a general scene description had resulted
in d iffe re n tia l accuracy performance under the a ttrib u te -d istra c to r con
d itio n , then such a find ing would evidence the perceptual effects of
in te rn a lly based contextual information.
not found in the present study.

However, such evidence was

I t i s possible to speculate about the

reasons that the proposed perceptual effects were not observed by con
sid e rin g the present role of prompting.

Providing subjects with the

description of a scene before they viewed the stimulus scene (array)
represented an attempt to activate a memory network in the observer cor
responding to the prompted scene . . .

a network f i l l e d with general

and prototypical information about the described scene, b u ilt from the
products of previous perceptual experiences with such scenes.
a c tiv a tio n , i t is presumed,

Such

i s o r d in a rily accomplished by the obser

v e r 's knowledge of where he or she is in the world at a given moment in
time.

That knowledge activates a set of expectations (founded upon

information contained in the memorial network) about what scenes and
objects the observer i s most l i k e ly to encounter next.

For example,

i t is probable that, when entering a house, one w ill encounter something
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commonly called a l i v i n g room, a kitchen, bedrooms, etc., and in those
rooms w ill observe a sofa, a toaster, and beds, etc.

The current usage

of verbal scene descriptions to a r t i f i c i a l l y activate such a set of ex
pectations may well have been unsuccessful.

A contributing factor to

this fa ilu r e may have been the chosen procedure of exposing subjects to
a combination of compatible, neutral, and incompatible descriptions.
Knowledge that the verbal descriptions were sometimes inappropriate to
the stimulus may have caused subjects to adopt a wait-and-see strategy,
whereby the stimulus scene (array) was processed perceptually and the
outcome of that processing was used to compare against the verbal descrip
tion.

I f such a comparison revealed that the description provided was

accurate ( i . e . , compatible with the scene or array in which the target
object was embedded), then the description was employed at the time of
response in the manner proposed in the preceding paragraph.
The fa ilu r e to influence the perceptual process by prompting in
the present study was also evidenced in a recent work by Biederman (1980,
in press).

In the study reported by Biederman, subjects given advance

information (in the form of verbal scene d escriptions) about the mean
ing of a stimulus scene were no more accurate or faster in detecting
objects within those scenes or objects that had undergone v io la tio n s
(Biederman 1977), than subjects who had received no advance information.
He argued that the process employed to perceive and interpret pictured
objects and scenes is so rapid and e ff ic ie n t that l i t t l e i s gained by
providing subjects with a verbal description of a scene p rio r to the ir
experience with it.

Consistent with the interpretation given the

present re su lts is Biederman's suggestion that what is influenced by
such advance information is not perception, "but some infe re ntial
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process that follows or proceeds in advance of, perception" (p. 35,
1980, in press [emphasis added]).
In that same d iscussion , Biederman also noted that the process
of presenting subjects with a verbal description of scenes may actually
interfere with the normal perceptual processes entailed in viewing and
processing scene information.

O rd in a rily, perceptual processing of a

real-world scene is not preceded by a period of verbally processing
semantically related material.

I f such interference occurred in the

present study as a re su lt of verbally prompting subjects, i t may help
to explain the two unexpected findings noted e a r lie r and discussed below.
Regarding the apparent independence of the two sources of contextu
al information in the ir effects upon recognition accuracy, i t is pos
s ib le that the manipulations employed in t h is study were simply not ef
fective in demonstrating the impact on perception of either internal
or external contextual information.

The verbal prompts might have been

more effe ctive had they a ll been compatible in nature, but the current
design (where compatible, neutral, and incompatible prompts were mixed)
may have induced subjects to attempt to ignore a ll contextual informa
tion provided them, at least until such time as they could judge i t to
be accurate re la tiv e to the stimulus scene or array.

An a lternative

p o s s i b i l i t y i s that an independence of internal and external contexts
tru ly e x ists, contrary to the duplex theory (see Introduction).

Per

haps each type of context adds something unique to the scene charac
te riz a tio n , such that when one source of contextual information is ab
sent the void cannot be f i l l e d by the presence of the other.

Also

implied in this la tte r notion is that, under certain circumstances,
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neither source of context may be u t iliz e d in the construction of the
scene characterization.
A verbal processing interference effect may also bear on the
fa ilu re of the current study to replicate the findings of previous
researches (e.g., Antes & Metzger, in press) showing that the presence
or absence of external contextual information interacts with the type of
response alternatives in the recognition test, in influencing subject
accuracy.

As mentioned before, such an 'interaction was indicated but

narrowly fa ile d to reach s t a t i s t i c a l sign ific a n c e .

A potential explana

tion for th is fa ilu r e is that the verbal processing required of sub
jects interfered with the usual course of v is u a lly processing scene and
object information.

By design, the current investigation was supposed

to be capable of testing this p o s s i b i l i t y by the inclusion of a no
prompt condition.

However, as this condition s t i l l entailed a certain

amount of verbal p rior to visual processing ( i . e . , the subject s t i l l had
to read the words, "NO PHRASE HERE"), i t provided no clear test of th is
interpretation.
The strong tendency for variation of externally based contextual
information to interact with the type of d istra c to r objects employed
in the recognition has important implications which j u s t i f y it s d isc u s
sion.

This finding i s perhaps best explained by invoking the d is t in c 

tion between the top-down and bottom-up processing of p ic to ria l i n f o r 
mation for la t e r recognition (see Friedman, in press; Lindsay & Norman
1977; Palmer 1975b).

According to th is d is t in c t io n , two types of i n 

formation processing can be ide ntifie d.

One type i s referred to as

bottom-up or data-driven processing, indicated when processing begins
with the a rriv a l of data from the stimulus, and where each stage in

105

the processing sequence acts upon the outcome of lower processing
stages until a recognition judgment is reached.

The second type of

information processing is called top-down or conceptually-driven, and
is characterized by processing in itia te d by some conceptualization or
hypothesis about the stimulus to be recognized, and proceeds by seek
ing evidence (data) to confirm or disconfirm th is i n i t i a l conceptualiza
tion.

I f confirming evidence i s available and there is l i t t l e data to

deny the hypothesis, that conceptualization is retained by the observer
and becomes the basis of the recognition judgment.

I f the evidence re

futes the currently operating hypothesis, a new conceptualization is
adopted and the process continues.

As pointed out by Lindsay and Norman

(1977), both types of information processing usually occur together;
that i s , information is extracted and processed from the stimulus, and
a conceptualization guides this processing and p a r t ia lly influences what
information w ill be extracted from the stimulus in the future ( i . e . ,
with additional viewing of the stim ulus).

However, depending upon the

conditions present at the time of viewing, one type of information
processing may dominate the perceptual processing of the stimulus at
a p artic u la r moment in time.
I f i t is realized that the recognition task in the present study
functions not only as a test, but also as an effective stimulus for
the subject, then it may reasonably be argued that the p a rtic u la r form
of the test employed ( i . e . , the p a rtic u la r type of response alterna
tives used) stimulated subjects to adopt either a predominantly bottomup or top-down processing strategy.

The adoption of such a strategy

could then be expected to re su lt in d iffe re n tia l accuracy performance
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re la tiv e to the presence or absence of physical context surrounding the
object to be recognized.
As discussed e a rlie r, general, s p e c if ic , or a combination of the
two types of information may be required of a subject depending upon the
type of d istra c to r objects employed in the object recognition test.
General information about the scene from which the targeted object would
t y p ic a lly come was required for an accurate recognition judgment to be
made when the d istra c to r objects were from scenes d is s im ila r to those
in which the target was usually found.

When the response alte rnative s

in the recognition test were objects usually found in a scene s im ila r to
that in which the target was presented but having a d iffe re n t id e ntity
(e.g., when a toaster must be chosen from among a pitcher, cookbook,
and place se ttin g not present in the stim ulus), more sp e c ific informa
tion was required for an accurate selection to occur.

One might guess

that in this la tte r situ a tio n a subject would probably process the con
tent of the scene to the point that a l i s t of object names was attained.
In the most demanding condition in th is study, the d istra c to r objects
used to assess recognition accuracy were objects that carried the same
name or label as the targeted object, but had been varied along some
physical dimension such that they differed from the target object in
appearance.

Clearly in this condition subjects would need to process

the p a rtic u la r objects which composed the scene in considerable d e ta il,
i f an accurate judgment was to ensue.

Since i t is a reasonable assump

tion that subjects would adopt the most e f f ic ie n t processing strategy
available, i t is probable that when general information was required
subjects adopted a predominantly top-down approach to processing i n 
formation from the scene (array), when sp e c ific information was
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required they u tiliz e d a predominantly bottom-up processing strategy,
and when a combination of general and sp e c ific information was necessi
tated subjects employed both types of information processing approaches
to maximize the rapid a v a i l a b i l i t y of both types of information.
The proposal that the d istra c to r type evokes a p a rtic u la r pro
cessing approach from the subject is consistent with the interpretation
given the d istra c to r type effect presented e a rlie r.

I t was noted at

that time that the proportion of a ll p ote ntia lly available general in f o r 
mation exceeds the proportion of a ll p ote ntia lly available sp e c ific in 
formation during the f i r s t few seconds of viewing.

I t is suggested that,

since the top-down strategy is best suited to extracting general i n f o r 
mation and the bottom-up strategy is best suited to extracting sp e c ific
information, where the observer is confronted with an extremely limited
amount of viewing time, the amount of general information extracted
when employing a top-down approach w ill exceed the amount of sp e c ific
information extracted while employing a bottom-up processing approach.
Thus, assuming the subject has employed the most e ff ic ie n t information
processing strategy availab le to him or her, i t would be expected (and
i t was found) that a subject faced with d istra c to r objects from d i s 
s im ila r scenes would be more accurate in recognizing target objects
than one confronted with d istra c to rs that varied from the target only
in physical appearance.
Support for the contention that d ifferent processing approaches
are adopted as a function of varying the d istra c to rs in the recognition
test may also be found in subject comments.

A clear pattern was found

showing that subjects in the context-present condition reported that
i t was much easier to determine a mismatch between the scene
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description ( i . e . , internal context) and the stimulus than to determine
a match between the two.

And, subjects in the context-absent condi

tion reported that i t was easier to id e ntify a match ( i . e . , correspon
dence) than a mismatch.
F in a lly , the current proposal is also consistent with the sugges
tion by Friedman (in press) and Friedman and Bourne (1976) that the
unique structural arrangement of information contained within a stimulus
large ly determines the depth and direction of the processing of that
information.

The present argument i s simply that the recognition task

functions as a stimulus and therefore can play an effective part in de
termining the processing strategy.
The question thus becomes, "What i s the effect of adopting a
p a rtic u la r processing strategy upon the a v a i l a b il i t y of external con
textual information as the two j o in t ly influence recognition accuracy?"
The results from the present study indicate that the adoption of a topdown processing strategy is fa c ilit a t e d by the presence of external con
text, whereas the adoption of a bottom-up approach i s most effective
when external contextual information is absent.

That accuracy was en

hanced when contextual information was present and top-down processing
was used points to the character of such processing . . . contextual
information is general in nature and top-down processing i s founded
upon general information.

Further, this finding confirms what has

previously been established (e.g., Antes & Metzger, in press; Biederman, et a l . 1974), that physical context aids in the rapid development
of a h o l i s t i c characterization of the scene.

When context i s absent,

general information is for the most part lacking, and the condition
where the u t iliz a t io n of a top-down strategy is most probable ( i . e . ,
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when d istra c to r objects are from d is s im ila r scenes) y ie ld s poorer recog
n itio n accuracy.

The finding that accuracy was better when a bottom-

up strategy was dominant ( i . e . , when d istra c to rs differed from the ta r
get in appearance only) and external context was absent, when compared
to the condition where such contextual information was present, re
quires a s l i g h t l y more complex explanation.
I f the processing of information from the scene (array) is bottomup, examining the detail of individual objects and then the relations
among objects, etc., then why are the context-present and context-absent
conditions not equal in the ir effects upon subject accuracy?
wer may be three-fold:

The ans

The presence of external context may re su lt in

some form of lateral in h ib itio n or physical confusion whereby objects
and other detail surrounding the target interfere with the perceptual
processing of sp e c if ic detail from the target, causing subjects in this
condition to be less accurate.

A second p o s s i b i l i t y i s that there may

simply be fewer objects to process in the context-absent condition such
that the proportion of a ll available detail processed i s greater in
th is condition than in the context-present condition, with the result
that accuracy is best in the former condition.

Or, the processing of

general information made possible by the a v a i l a b il i t y of contextual
information in the context-present condition may have interfered with
the encoding and storage of sp e c ific object detail.

This la s t p o s s i

b i l i t y stems from the assumption of the duplex theory that external
contextual information helps to in sta ntia te a h o l i s t i c internal repre
sentation of the scene, and that a major function of such a repre
sentation is to guide attention and the course of processing to confirm

no
expectations consistent with that representation.

Subjects may have

u tiliz e d the detailed object information gathered from the bottom-up
processing to confirm the expectations generated by the presence of
contextual information, and once confirmed, the information stored by
the subject for use in the recognition test was more prototypical than
sp e c ific in form.

For such an interpretation to be acceptable, i t must

be conceded that there e xists a tendency to store information in it s
prototypical rather than sp e c ific form whenever a more general or g lo 
bal scene characterization is available (see Friedman, in press), and
that the presence of contextual information leads ne cessarily to the
formulation of an integrated schematic representation of the scene from
which the context was processed (see Biederman 1980, in press).

Accord

ing to th is interpretation, recognition accuracy in the present inves
tiga tion would be superior when external contextual information was
absent and detail gathered via a bottom-up strategy could be encoded
and remembered without interference in i t s o rig in a l sp e c ific form.
Poorer accuracy would re su lt when the preferred bottom-up processing
was interfered with by the a v a i l a b il i t y of additional irre le va nt (re la 
tive to the task) d e ta il, or when interference occurred during encoding
and storage.
Confidence Ratings
The present inve stiga tion also examined subjects' confidence in
the ir recognition judgments as i t varied with manipulations in contextual
information and the form of the recognition test employed.

While no

sp e c ific a p rio ri hypotheses concerning th is measure had been proposed,
i t was expected that subjects would be most confident in the ir

m
recognition judgments when the recognition task was administered in it s
least d i f f i c u l t format ( i . e . , when d istra c to r objects were from scenes
d is s im ila r to those in which the target objects were t y p ic a lly located),
and when the greatest amount of contextual information (both internal
and external) was available.
The observed pattern of confidence ratings were predominantly
but not f u ll y consistent with th is expectation.

Subjects were more

confident about the ir responses when the recognition test demanded gener
al rather than sp e c if ic information about the scene and targeted objects,
and they were more confident when internal context was provided i f i t
was compatible with the scene or array they subsequently viewed.

Un

expected was the finding that the presence or absence of an external
context did not d if f e r e n t ia lly affect the confidence that subjects d i s 
played in the ir recognition judgments.
The finding that confidence was greater when general rather than
sp e c if ic information was required may be explained in terms of task
d i f f i c u l t y , sim ila r to the interpretation given the accuracy re su lts
for this variable.

Subjects confronted with attrib ute d istra c to rs in

the recognition te st were obviously in a more demanding situ a tio n than
subjects required to discriminate the target object from scene or object
d istra c to rs, and the ir confidence ratings reflected this difference in
demand.

That subject confidence did not vary su b sta n tia lly between the

scene d istra c to r and object d istra c to r conditions may point to the in 
fluence of general information upon a su b je c t's feeling of confidence.
In both of these conditions, as argued e a rlie r, general information about
the object targeted and the scenes in which i t is normally found is
required, and top-down information processing (either predominantly or
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equally with bottom-up processing) is most probably evoked.

Perhaps

subjects tend to feel more confident when they are, at least p a r t ia lly ,
guided in the ir observation of the visual environment by some set of
expectations regarding it s content.

I f so, then th is finding seems

most reasonable.
The finding that subjects were more confident in the ir recognition
judgments under the compatible prompt condition than under either the
neutral or incompatible prompting conditions may most e a s ily be ex
plained by looking at where in the course of the present task these
scene descriptions may have had th e ir greatest impact on the accuracy
of recognition responses.

As discussed e a rlie r, i t is most l i k e ly that

such verbal descriptions are subjected to a wait-and-see strategy by
the subject, where they are compared to the outcome of perceptually
processing the stimulus and a judgment is made regarding the compatability of the scene description and the perceived stimulus scene (array).
I f the description i s determined to be compatible i t is employed at
the time the recognition response i s made, and i f determined to be i n 
compatible i t is ignored as best as possible.

Subjects were more con

fident when they f e l t they had two pieces of information ( i . e . , the
scene description and the target object i t s e l f ) on which to base the ir
recognition response than when they f e l t , as a re su lt of th e ir own
comparative and judgmental processes, that they had only a s in g le piece
of information (the object i t s e l f ) on which to base that response.
The f a ilu re to find any s i g n if ic a n t differences in assigned confidence
ratings when the neutral and incompatible prompting conditions were
compared, supports the notion that subjects tended to ignore the i n 
compatible scene descriptions ( i . e . , treat them as though they were
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neutral or nonexistent descriptions) when they were assessing how much
confidence they were w illin g to place in th e ir recognition responses.
That subject confidence did not vary su b sta n tia lly depending upon
the presence or absence of external contextual information reinforces
the suggestion made e a r lie r that employing a mixture of compatible,
n e u tra l, and incompatible scene descriptions p rior to the stimulus
presentation may have interfered with the ordinary course of v is u a lly
processing information from a scene (array), to the extent that the
normal influence of external contextual information upon
of an object was disrupted.

the perception

I t is conceivable that such a disruption

led subjects to discount the presence or absence of th is type of con
textual information in assigning confidence to the ir recognition judg
ments .
The lack of a D istractor by Prompt interaction using the confidence
measure, v is - a - v i s the presence of that interaction with the accuracy
measure, may be interpreted as evidence that regardless of the d i f f i 
culty level of the recognition test subjects f e l t more confident and
secure in th e ir responses when they had information about the context
of the stimulus, and they knew (judged) that information to be com
patible.

As discussed e a rlie r, accuracy was s ig n i f i c a n t l y better

when compatible (compared to neutral or incompatible) scene descriptions
were provided, but only when the d if f i c u l t y of the discrim ination was
at a minimum.
Weighted Confidence Scores
P rio r to d isc u ssin g the findings with th is measure, i t is impor
tant to consider i t s nature.

The weighted confidence scores represent
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a combination of subjects' recognition accuracy scores and th e ir ratings
of confidence associated with the recognition responses.

Thus, th is

measure does not correspond to any overt response given by subjects
and therefore must be interpreted cautiously.

As the score is weighted

in such a way as to result in higher values when a high confidence r a t 
ing is paired with an accurate recognition response and the lowest
values re su lt when a high confidence rating has been assigned to an in 
accurate recognition judgment, one interpretation of these scores is
that they represent the a b i l i t y of subjects to appropriately or accur
ately place th e ir confidence.

I t is in th is sense that the weighted

confidence scores were employed in the present study and for this d i s 
cussion.

The synthesis of accuracy and confidence measures was used to

determine i f the discrepancy between the pattern of findings for these
two measures studied in iso la t io n could be better understood, and to
discover i f an integrated measure might reveal the anticipated external
context by d istra c to r type interaction indicated by the accuracy data.
The presence and compatabi1it y of a pre-stimulus verbal scene
description interacted with the type of d istra c to r objects employed in
the recognition test in th e ir effects upon subject accuracy in that
test.

However, subject confidence did not reveal this interaction;

both the presence and compatability of a pre-stimulus scene description
and the type of d istra c to rs used in the test s i g n i f i c a n t l y affected
subject confidence, but their effects were apparently independent.
When this interaction was examined using weighted confidence scores
i t fa ile d to reach sign ific a n c e .

Further, these scores were not d if f e r 

e n t ia lly influenced by the three prompting conditions.

That subjects
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were no better or worse at judging the ir recognition performance when
the effects of the three types of verbal scene descriptions were com
pared may be interpreted by proposing that only a knowledge of task
d i f f i c u l t y i s effective in allowing subjects to accurately judge the ir
recognition responses as correct; information concerning the nature
of the scene to be viewed may be beneficial (or detrimental, i f incom
patible) to the recognition response and may influence how much c o n fi
dence the subject places in that response, but i t does not provide the
subject with a good basis for appropriately placing confidence.

One

explanation for th is finding is that th is "extra" information about
the nature (meaning) of the scene lu lle d the subjects into a fa lse sense
of se curity about the accuracy of their recognition judgments.
Such an interpretation is supported by the finding that scores
on th is measure were su b sta n tia lly higher when the form of the recogni
tion test included d istra c to r objects that were from d is s im ila r scenes
than when the response a lternatives were objects from sim ila r scenes
but d iffe re n t in id e ntity, or the same objects but varied in appearance.
When subjects f e lt they were faced with a d i f f i c u l t discrim ination in
the recognition test, they were le ast able to accurately judge their
recognition responses.

As the d i f f i c u l t y lessened, they became in 

cre a singly more p ro fic ie n t in judging these responses.
As presented in the Results, weighted confidence scores also
varied d if f e r e n t ia lly and s i g n i f i c a n t l y as a re su lt of the interaction
between the presence or absence of external context and the type of
d istra c to r objects employed in the recognition task.

That subjects were

more capable of accurately a ssig n in g confidence ratings to the ir
response when external contextual information was present and the
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d istra c to rs were objects from d is s im ila r scenes, and were also more ac
curate when context was absent and the d istra c to rs differed from the
target object in appearance only, suggests that the demand for object
detail when processing from the bottom up, and the demand fo r general
information about the object when scene information is being processed
from the top down may create an ideal circumstance for subjects to be
able to judge the accuracy of the ir own responses.

When the demand is

for general information about the scene and only an array of objects
is available, subjects must struggle with the decision as to which pro
cessing strategy is most l ik e ly to be p rofita b le , and that struggle
in h ib it s an accurate assessment of performance.

Likewise, when sp e c ific

detail about pictured objects is required by the task at hand and
additional irre le va nt detail i s presented ( i . e . , context-present,
a ttr ib u te -d ist ra c to r condition), a sim ila r struggle may ensue and
s im ila r ly place the subject in the worst position possib le for being
able to accurately judge his or her own performance.
The interpretations given findings with the weighted confidence
scores assume that a su b je c t's awareness of his or her accuracy on the
task employed in the present study is actually reflected in th e ir
assignment of confidence ratings to the responses given in that task.
Further, i t is necessary to point out that this measure i s completely
dependent upon the accuracy and confidence measures, with i t s unique
ness due to the p a rtic u la r combination of these measures.

In conse

quence, the finding that certain variable manipulations s i g n i f i c a n t l y
affected th is measure when they had sim ila r effects upon accuracy and
confidence considered apart, may be expected on the basis of this
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dependent relationship.

The potential value of th is measure appears to

l i e in it s a b i l i t y to o ffe r additional information concerning the s it u a 
tion which a rise s when the anticipated consistency between the two p r i 
mary measures i s not found.

I t may or may not be a more se n sitiv e

measure of the effects of variable manipulations than the two measures
associated with overt responses.
Summary and Implications
I t is possible to summarize the findings of the present in v e stig a 
tion by considering the influences of the two types of information
available in a p ic to ria l representation of real world scenes and of
the demands imposed on the subject by the p a rtic u la r task employed to
study the perception of these representations.
I t may be inferred from the duplex theory of picture perception
that when pictures of scenes and objects are viewed for a very b rie f
period of time, more general than sp e c ific information is processed
from these pictures.

Object recognition performance in the present

study re fle cts the d iffe re n tia l a v a i l a b il i t y of these two kinds of
information, as both accuracy and confidence were greatest under condi
tions where general, as opposed to sp e c if ic or detailed, information
about the object and scene tested was required to discriminate the
targeted object from the alternatives.

With increased viewing time

( i . e . , longer stimulus exposures), the duplex theory suggests that the
difference in the a v a i l a b il i t y of general and sp e c if ic object in fo ri mation would become less pronounced, eventually reducing to zero as
the processing of both general and sp e c ific information reached an
asymptote.

While the present study did not employ extended exposure
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times, i t can be predicted that the increase in viewing time would re
s u lt in the absence of accuracy and confidence differences for the
scene and attribute d istra c to r conditions studied here.
The duplex theory also postulates that one source of general in f o r 
mation about a pictured scene i s in the form of a memorial network,
organized on the basis of past experiences that the observer has had
with s im ila r scenes, which f a c ilit a t e s the recognition of objects em
bedded in that scene.

This f a c i li t a t i o n may occur at two places during

the recognition task, either during the processing and encoding of the
object and/or at the time the recognition response i s made.

In the

current study, an attempt was made to activate th is memory network by
providing subjects with a verbal description of a scene (e.g., "KITCHEN
SCENE").

I t was found that such verbal prompting did in fact help

in the recognition of objects, but apparently th is influence was
limited to the time the response was given.

I t was suggested that

the f a ilu re of the verbal scene descriptions to influence the course
of perceptual processing in the present study was due to the employment
of incompatible and neutral, as well as compatible scene descriptions.
Because of th is , subjects were induced to adopt a wait-and-see strategy
regarding the use of these scene descriptions until such time as they
could make a judgment regarding th e ir compatabi1i t y .

That judgment

required that the stimulus scene or array of objects be at le ast
p a r t ia lly processed, and thus the manipulation had l i t t l e effect upon
the perception of the objects.

A possible test for the perceptual

effects of this in te rn a lly based contextual information would be the
pre-stimulus administration of compatible ( i . e . , appropriate) scene
descriptions to one group of subjects, providing a second group of
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subjects with no pre-stimulus information, and then comparing the per
formance of the two groups on an object recognition test using d istra c tors sim ila r to those in the a ttrib u te -d ist ra c to r condition of the
present study.

If , as the duplex theory proposes, providing the ob

server with general information p rio r to his or her exposure to the
scene f a c i li t a t e s the e ff ic ie n t extraction of detailed or sp e c ific ob
ject information from that scene, then any differences in object recogn i z a b il i t y between two such groups could reasonably be attributed to
the d iffe re n tia l impact of the presence or absence of internal a p rio ri
general information upon the perceptual process.
Subjects in the present study were also more confident in the ir
recognition responses when they f e lt they had two (both a scene descrip
tion and the object i t s e l f ) rather than a s in g le (just the object)
piece of information on which to base those responses.

That subjects

were most confident when scene descriptions were compatible with the
scene (array) they a ctually viewed, assigning equally low ratings to
th e ir recognition judgments when the stimulus had been preceded by
either a neutral or incompatible scene description, is additional
evidence that a comparative process is occurring between the informa
tion provided p rior to the stimulus ( i . e . , the pre-stimulus prompt)
and the information gathered d ire c tly from the stimulus by the subject.
F in a lly , the p a rtic u la r format of the task u t iliz e d in te sting
object recognizabi1i t y may p a r t ia lly determine the type of information
processing strategy engaged in by the subject.

Information may be

processed from a scene (array of objects) in a predominantly bottom-up
fashion, in a predominantly top-down fashion, or i t may be processed
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by using a combination of these two approaches.

Depending upon the

amount of sp e c ific object detail required by the recognition task for
an accurate response to re su lt, the adoption of one of these three
general processing strate gie s w ill occur.

I t was proposed that when

the task demands only general information concerning the object to be
recognized, a predominantly top-down approach to processing information
w ill be selected.

When the recognition test demands a detailed know

ledge of the targeted object, a predominantly bottom-up processing
strategy is adopted, and when the test necessitates the ac q u isitio n of
both general and sp e c ific information for an accurate discrim ination, a
combination of the two information processing approaches is used.

In

addition, i t was suggested that each p a rtic u la r processing strategy
is either fa c ilit a t e d or inhibited by the presence of physical context
in the stimulus scene (array).

According to the duplex theory, such

external contextual information provides the observer with a more gen
eral than sp e c ific type of information about the pictured scene and
the objects contained within it.

On this b asis, a reasonable conclu

sion is that the adoption of a predominantly top-down processing
strategy is f a c ilit a t e d by the presence of external context, whereas
the selection of a predominantly bottom-up strategy is f a c ilit a t e d by
the absence of such contextual information.
The resu lts from the present study are supportive of th is con
ceptualization; subjects were most accurate in the object recognition
task when it s format required general information and external context
was available, and when it s format demanded sp e c ific detail and
external contextual information was absent.

However, these results
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re fle c t a trend rather than s ig n if ic a n t differences in performance.
I t was suggested that the fa ilu re of these differences to reach s i g n i f i
cant proportions may have been due to some degree of interference with
the processing of external context by the presence of scene descrip
tions which were varied in appropriateness to that context.

For this

reason, a v e rific a tio n of the rela tionship between information process
ing strategies and the contextual information available to the observer
as proposed in the preceding paragraph, should be conducted with verbal
scene descriptions excluded from the procedure.
Taken as a whole, the findings of this inve stigation are quite sup
portive of the tenets of the duplex theory of picture perception.

In

addition, they point to the ever-present role of the experimental task
as an influence upon sub jects' reactions and responses.

I t remains the

task for future research to assess the nature of contextual informa
tion, and to explicate the c r i t i c a l elements which contribute to it s
formulation and activation as a major factor in our perception of p ic 
tures .

APPENDICE

APPENDIX A

INSTRUCTIONS READ TO ALL SUBJECTS

This study is concerned with how people perceive pictures.
S p e c ific a lly , I am interested in the kinds of information people
receive when viewing a picture for a very b rie f time, and the ir
a b i l i t y to u t i l i z e that information in an object recognition test.
B a sic a lly , the task involves viewing a (an) picture (array of
objects), presented very b rie fly , and then deciding which of four
objects came from that picture (array).

P rio r to viewing each picture

(array of objects), you w ill be required to read a short phrase written
in this notebook [point].

The phrase may simply be the words "NO

PHRASE HERE," or i t may consist of a meaningful description of a p ic 
tured scene.

On one-half of the t r i a l s , this description w ill be an

accurate description of the picture (array of objects) that you w ill
view . . .

on the other half, the description w ill not be accurate.

Of course you w ill have no way of knowing which i s the case until you
a ctually see the picture (array).

In any case, i t i s important that

you attend to the phrase you read.

After you have read the phrase,

you are to look into th is viewing aperature [point] and stare at the
"X" on the display screen.

When you have located the "X" and are

looking d ire c tly at i t , say "READY," and sh o rtly thereafter a (an)
picture (array of objects) w ill be flashed on the screen.

Once the

picture (array) disappears, decide which one of the four objects
pictured in the notebook was contained in the picture (array) you saw
on the screen.
you.

Indicate your response on the answer sheet in front of

Also, I am asking you to indicate the amount of confidence you

feel you can place in each selection you make.

You can do th is by

c i r c l i n g the appropriate number on that same sheet.
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Following t h is ,
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turn the page in the notebook and the phrase corresponding to the next
picture (array of objects) w ill be v is ib le , and the next t r ia l w ill
begin.
To summarize the steps involved in the task:

read the phrase in

the notebook, fixate the "X" on the display screen and then say "READY"
[when you look into the viewing aperature I w ill turn the page in the
notebook with the phrase so that the four objects are v i s i b l e ] , after
the picture (array of objects) disappears look to the notebook and se
lect the object you think was contained in the presentation, indicate
th is selection on the answer sheet, and c ir c le the number that corres
ponds to the degree of confidence you have in that p a rtic u la r selection
Do you have any questions concerning what you are supposed to do?
OK.
t r ia l s .

There w ill be s ix practice t r i a l s followed by th ir ty test
At the conclusion of a ll t h i r t y - s i x t r i a l s , I w ill explain in

more depth the nature of the study and inform you of your performance
on the object recognition test.
any questions you may have.

At that time I w ill also try to answer
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Name

Answer Sheet

A

B

C

0

Write the number corresponding to the cell containing the object from the display
on the blank, to the left of the trial number.

0

1

not at all
confident

2

.

.

3

A

.

extremely
confident

Circle the number chat corresponds to the amount of confidence
you place in your selection.

PI.

0

1

2

3

A

13.

0

1

2

3

A

P2.

0

1

2

3

A

1A.

0

1

2

3

A

P3.

0

1

2

3 A

15.

0

1

2

3

A

PA.

0

1

2

3

A

16.

0

1

2

3

A

P5.

0

1

2

3

A

17. _

0

1

2

3

A

P6.

0

1

2

3

A

18.

0

1

2

3

A

1.

0

1

2

3

A

19.

0

1

2

3

A

2.

0

1

2

3 A

20.

0

1

2

3

A

3.

0

1

2

3 A

21.

0

1

2

3

A

A.

0

1

2

3

A

22.

0

1

2

3

A

5.

0

1

2

3

A

23.

0

1

2

3

A

6.

0

1

2

3

A

2A.

0

1

2

3

A

7.

0

1

2

3

A

25.

0

1

2

3

A

8.

0

1

2

3

A

26.

0

1

2

3

A

9. _

0

1

2

3

A

27.

0

1

2

3

A

10.

0

1

2

3

A

28.

0

1

2

3

A

11. _

0

1

2

3

A

29.

0

1

2

3

A

12.

0

1

2

3

A

30.

0

1

2

3

A
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Table 7
Context by D istra c to r3 by Prompt ANOVA Summary:
Number of Correct Recognition Responses

Source

df

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

F

Context (C)

1

.34

.34

D istra ctor (D)

1

315.06

315.06

86.^7***

C X D

1

16.67

16.67

4.56*

44

160.70

3.65

Prompt (P)

2

24.67

12.33

C X P

2

1.72

.96

D X P

2

30.17

15.08

C X D X P

2

3.56

1.78

.92

88

170.56

1.94

-

143

723.44

Error (between)

Error (within)
Total

.09

6.36**
.44
7.7 8***

a - Object condition excluded from D istra c to r factor in analysis
*p < .05
**p < .01
***p

< . 00 1

Table 8
Context by D istra c to r3 by Prompt ANOVA Summary:
Number of Correct Recognition Responses

Source

df

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

F

Context (C)

1

1.36

1.36

D istra ctor (D)

1

144.00

144.00

C X D

1

5.44

5.44

1.24

44

192.94

4.38

-

Prompt (P)

2

40.62

20.31

C X P

2

8.60

4.30

2.20

D X P

2

16.62

8.31

4.26*

C X D X P

2

.60

.30

88

171.56

1.95

143

581.75

Error (between)

Error (within)
Total

.31
32.83***

10.42***

.15
-

a - Attribute condition excluded from D istra c to r factor in a n a ly sis
*p < .05
***p

< . 00 1
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Table 9
Context by D istra ctor by Prompt3 ANOVA Summary:
Number of Correct Recognition Responses

Source

df

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Squares

F

Context (C)

1

.00

.00

D istractor (D)

2

247.72

123.86

C X D

2

15.17

7.58

2.49

66

201.00

3.04

-

Prompt (P)

1

21.78

21.78

10.63**

C X P

1

2.78

2.78

1.36

D X P

2

29.56

14.78

7.22**

C X D X P

2

2.72

1.36

.66

66

135.17

2.05

-

143

655.89

Error (between)

Error (within)
Total

40.67***

a - Neutral condition excluded from Prompt factor in a nalysis
**p < .01
***p < .001

APPENDIX D

TABLE 10

T a b l e 10

Means for Each Subject Used in A na lysis Reported in Text
Neutral
Prompt

Compatible
Prompt

Absent

11
"

Scene

.5
3.0
2.0
2.6
1.3
.7
2.8
2.6
3.5
1.9
2.4
2.8

.5
2.8
1.6
2.6
.9
.7
2.6
2.4
3.5
1.7
1.6
2.8

5
8
9
8
5
6
7
6
6
5
8
9

1.4
2.9
2.4
2.8
1.3
.4
.7
1.4
2.8
2.0
2.7
2.2

1.2
2.7
2.2
2.8
.9
.4
.5
1.0
.6
.8
2.1
2.0

5
9
7
7
8
7
8
5
5
4
8
10

1.6
3.0
1.9
2.6
2.2
1.6
2.2
.9
3.1
2.0
1.8
1.9

1.6
2.8
.9
2.0
2.2
1.6
2.0
.3
.3
- .4
1.2
1.9

10
8
6
8
10
10

1.9
1.6
.7
2.5
2.2
1.4

1.9
1.2
.7
2.3
2.2
1.4

8
7
7
8
8
8

1.8
1.8
1.6
2.7
2.3
1.0

1.8
1.6
1.6
2.1
1.9
1.0

3
8
2
6
7
7

.3
2.1
0
2.8
2.6
1.6

.3
1.5
0
1.2
1.8
1.2

CD
CD
fO
s~
CD
>
C

C
CD
"U
•r—

c£Z
O

0
(11)

dr Weighted
3 Confidenc

2
3
7
8
26
27

"
11

7
9
7
9
6
9
9
9
10
7
8
10

Number
3 Correct

Scene

Weighted
Confi dene

Present

0
(4)

Average
-2 Confidenc

12
14
18
19
36
38
42
4-3
60
62
66
67

CD

4->
C- u
CD CD
_ Q SE t13 O
z:

— -

D istra ctor
(3)

CD

CD

Number
Correct

Context
(2)

CD

—' Weighted
-2- Confidene

Subject #
0)

CD

— Average
Confidenc

CD

Incompatible
Prompt

CO
OJ>

( 11 )

( 12 )

8
6
4
5
7
3

2.0
1.1
1.6
2.4
1.7
1.4

2.0
.9
.2
.7
1.3
0

1.5
.8
1.6
.5
1.0
0
- .8
- .7
- .9
.7
.8
- .8

6
7
6
5
6
6
4
5
3
4
4
4

2.4
1.3
1.7
2.0
1.9
2.8
1.6
1.3
1.2
.5
1.7
2.0

.6
1.1
.3
1.0
1.1
1.4
.4
.3
- .2
.3
.1
0

.9
.5
.5
.8
.8
- .4
1.4
.7
.3
.2

2
4
4
6
6
3
6
4
5
6

1.7
1.8
1 .8
2.7
2.2
.9
1.5
1.8
1.7
1.7

- .5
.6
- .2
.3
1.2
.5
.3
.6
.7
1.3

(3)

(4)

(5)

( 6)

( 7)

(8)

(9)

6
6
5
4
7
7

1.9
1.8
1.5
1.6
1.5
2.1

.9
1.6
- .1
- .6
1.5
1.5

w u lU ^ -J w w -ti^lt^a)C ^o^

(2)

2.7
1.0
2.2
2.1
2.0
1.8
2.2
2.1
1.3
1.1
2.4
2.4

cncnCT><Ti— ‘ tT><ncT>cn^i

0 )

1.9
1.7
1.3
2.8
2.4
.4
1.4
2.9
1.5
1.2

31
32
50
51
55
56

Absent
ll
II
ll
ll
ll

Scene
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll

10
10
4
6
9
7

2.2
2.7
2.1
1.8
2.0
2.2

2.2
2.7
.1
.2
2.0
1.8

9
15
16
17
33
39
40
41
57
63
64
65

Present
II
ll
II
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll

Object
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll

4
4
2
5
6
7
7
7
4
6
5
5

2.9
1.1
1.6
1.3
2.5
2.2
2.2
2.2
1.3
1.7
1.5
2.1

- .3
.7
-1.0
- .1
.9
.8
1.4
1.2
- .5
1.1
- .1
.6

1
5
11
24
25
29
35
48
49
53

Absent
II
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
II

Object
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll

4
4
5
5
6
2
8
4
8
6

1.6
1.3
1.5
2.2
2.3
1.0
1.4
2.6
2.3
1.5

.6
.3
.1
.2
.7
- .2
1.4
.1
1.7
.7

( 10 )

GO

-P*

( 1)

(2)

(3)

( 4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

)8)

(9)

( 10 )

( 11 )

( 12 )

Absent
II

Object
ll

7
6

2.4
1.8

2.0
1.4

2.0
1.1

.8
.7

6
3

2.4
.6

1.4
.2

4
10
13
22
28
34
37
46
52
58
61
70

Present
II
li
II
II
II
ll
II
ll
ll
ll
ll

Attribute
ll
ll
ll
ll
II
II
II
II
ll
ll
II

2
4
3
4
3
3
1
4
4
6
5
4

1.0
.5
.5
1.4
1.7
.7
1.4
1.1
1.5
1.6
.2
3.0

- .5
.3
.3
.4
- .3
- .5
-1.0
- .3
- .1
.6
.2
- .2

1.6
.8
.9
1.4
1.5
.3
.8
.8
1.3
1.6
.4
2.3

.4
.4
.3
.2
.9
.1
.2
0
.3
.2
.4
.3

5
3
4
6
5
3
3
3
5
2
3
4

1.4
.4
.4
1.5
2.0
.5
.8
1.1
1.2
1.0
.1
2.5

.8
.4
.2
.5
.4
.1
- .3
.1
.4
.2
.1
- .5

6
20
21
23
30
44
45
47
54
68
69
71

Absent
ll
II
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
II
ll
ll
ll

5
6
7
1
3
3
5
3
4
5
4
7

1.9
2.1
1.3
1.8
1.4
1.5
1.9
.4
.9
1.9
.8
1.8

.5
.5
1.3
-1.6
- .4
.7
.1
0
- .1
1.1
.8
.6

-

-

-

-

-

-

CO

tncricrirocriCjo<ncniN3CocTioo

Attribute
ll
ll
ll
ll
II
ll
ll
ll
ll
II
ll

cn-P»ootnoj-P>norocooooitn

59
72

1.3
2.3
.7
2.1
1.6
.8
.9
.6
1.2
1.8
1.0
1.2

.1
.7
.3
-1.2
.4
.2
-1.0
.6
- .4
1.0
.8
.4

2
6
4
4
6
7
4
5
5
4
5
4

1.7
2.3
.2
1.8
1.3
1.8
1.3
.7
.8
2.2
.4
.9

- .3
.3
0
0
.7
1.4
.1
.5
.6
.6
.2
.3

cn
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